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Revisiting and Reinforcing the Farmers Fox Theory: A Study (Test) of 
Three Cases in Cross-border Inbound Acquisitions 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to revisit and reinforce the early-development of Farmers Fox theory 
(Reddy et al. 2014a) through analyzing three cases in cross-border inbound acquisitions 
stream. A qualitative case method is adopted to explore findings from sampling cases include 
Vodafone-Hutchison telecom deal, Bharti Airtel-MTN broken telecom deal and Vedanta-
Cairn India oil deal. We have highlighted discussions on organizational factors, due diligence 
issues, deal characteristics and country-specific determinants. Importantly, we have tested 
various theories propounded in economics and organization’s literature, and thereby 
established an interdisciplinary setting both to redefine the theory and to reframe the 
propositions. We thus propose that the government officials’ erratic nature and ruling 
political party influence was more in foreign inward deals that characterize higher bid value, 
listed target company, cash payment, and stronger government control in the industry. Lastly, 
the findings from this case research not only help researchers in strategy and international 
business but also help multinational managers participating in cross-border negotiations.  
 
Keywords: Cross-border mergers and acquisitions, Foreign market entry strategies, 
Farmers fox theory, Institutional theory, Liability of foreignness, Internationalization, 
Emerging economies. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Theoretical underpinnings 
From the lens of development economics theory, international organizations and economic 
researchers have classified the given economic condition into two groups such as developed 
and developing countries. While supporting this streak, scholars from sociology, political and 
legal studies have improved the definition of economy based on regulatory governance and 
political institutions. The two approaches suggested that developed economies have better 
quality of laws, regulations and institutions, which result in rich economic performance. By 
contrast, developing economies characterize poor economic result, less quality of institutions, 
no significant expertise in public administration, highly corrupted government officials, 
erratic behavior of institutions and high political intervention. In this vein, Lucas (1990) 
postulated “why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries” in which he suggested 
weak institutional environment is one of the important determinants that result in insufficient 
capital flows from rich to poor nations. We believe this is an institutional dichotomous 
characteristic of developing economy and scholars coined this problem as “Lucas paradox” 
(Alfaro et al. 2008). Theoretically, a given country has two investment options to do business 
in other countries, namely direct international investment and portfolio investment. Direct 
investment allows the investor to entry in foreign country through greenfield investment, 
and/or mergers and acquisitions. Conversely, alternative entry mode choices include 
exporting, franchising, and licensing, just to mention a few. 
Because of 1985-1991 economic and institutional policy reforms, developing 
countries have improved their economic indicators, regulatory laws and business culture, and 
thereby attracted significant overseas investment in various industries. In other words, a great 
deal of financial and non-financial benefits have engulfed from developed to developing 
economies due to overseas investment reforms. For instance, the benefits include business 
models, education, management expertise, technology, culture, living standards, and so forth. 
Following the globalization and liberalization programs, the distance between countries has 
reduced, markets have integrated, and communication cost has declined sharply, together lead 
to the closer integration of societies (Stiglitz 2004). At the same time, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) from developed economies have increased their investment in 
developing countries through a preferred method of foreign market entry that is mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) [besides, greenfield investment]. This method offers numerous benefits 
ranging from ownership to location advantages, while it attracts significant risks, especially 
economic, regulatory and political shocks (Bris and Cabolis 2008; Kiymaz 2009; Meschi and 
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Métais 2006; Rossi and Volpin 2004). For instance, the extant M&A research reported that 
83% of deals failed to create shareholder value and 53% actually destroyed value (ac cited in 
Marks and Mirvis 2011:162). In case of international deals, the failure rate ranges from 45% 
to 67% (Mukherji et al. 2013). Albeit, the world market for corporate control activities has 
substantially improved during 1991-2012 period, particularly from the sixth merger wave 
started in 2003 (Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo 2011). For example, worldwide number 
of cross-border deals (deal value) have increased at a massive growth rate of 241% (1360%) 
from 1,582 (US$21.09 billion) in 1991 to 5,400 (US$308.06 billion) in 2012. In case of Asian 
market, sales, in terms of number of deals (deal value) have notably improved at a significant 
growth rate of 908% (1,818%) from 79 (US$1.54 billion) in 1991 to 796 (US$29.48 billion) 
in 2012. Conversely, purchases, in terms of number of deals (deal value) have drastically 
increased at a considerable growth rate of 833% (3,521%) from 82 (US$2.20 billion) in 1991 
to 765 (US$79.78 billion) in 2012. While percentage of value of cross-border deals out of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows for the period 1991-2012, reported an average annual 
growth rate of 37% for worldwide countries and 13% for Asian market (UNCTAD 2013). 
Herewith, we postulate that cross-border inward investment has shockingly declined 
for both Asian and India market, while outward investment has massively increased due to 
lower asset valuations in developed markets as well as to escape from home country 
institutional barriers (Reddy et al. 2014b; Witt and Lewin 2007). Besides, mounting overseas 
acquisitions in emerging markets we have noticed that both inbound and outbound deals 
often litigate, or induce by institutional shocks of the host country when deals characterize 
higher valuation, cash payment and strong government control over the industry. For 
instance, Zhang et al. (2011:226) reported that 68.7% of worldwide acquisition attempts have 
completed for the period 1982-2009 in which 210,183 deals found to be uncompleted 
(460,710 deals completed) out of 670,893 acquisition events. Thus, we are interested to 
analyze those litigated inbound deals associated to Asian emerging market-India. 
Extant international business (IB) and finance studies found that a country’s 
constitutional framework, political and legal environment, bilateral trade relations and culture 
play an important role in cross-border trade and investment deals both at ex-ante and at ex-
post performance. For example, in Alguacil et al. (2011); Barbopoulos et al. (2012); Bris and 
Cabolis (2008); Erel et al. (2012), Francis et al. (2008); di Giovanni (2005); Huizinga and 
Voget (2009); Hur et al. (2011); and Rossi and Volpin (2004), the authors suggested that 
legal infrastructure, corporate governance practices, financial markets development, level of 
investor protection, quality of accounting and reporting standards and socio-cultural factors 
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are being key determinants affecting the cross-border M&As completion. Further, 
macroeconomic factors include gross domestic product, tax system and tax incentives, 
exchange rate and inflation rate have significant impact on overseas acquisitions (Blonigen 
1997; Hebous et al. 2011; Pablo 2009; Scholes and Wolfson 1990; Uddin and Boateng 2011). 
While, Moskalev (2010) found that number of overseas investment projects have 
significantly improved with respect to the progress in host country’s legal enforcement for 
foreign investors. Importantly, local political events including general elections affect both 
inbound and outbound FDI flows (Ezeoha and Ogamba 2010; Schöllhammer and Nigh 1984, 
1986), and physical distance has impact on foreign investments (Rose, 2000). Overall, value-
creating strategies such as mergers, acquisitions and strategic joint ventures promote 
corporate governance and institutional development (Alba et al. 2009; Martynova and 
Renneboog 2008b).  
With this in mind, we examine cross-border inbound acquisitions to the emerging 
country-India through a legitimate method of qualitative research, i.e. case study research. 
Thus, we deeply investigate why cross-border inbound deals frequently litigate in India. Prior 
to explain our research sketch, we would wish to present what factors determine the success 
of cross-border M&As. The extant literature on cross-border M&As suggested that firm-
specific, deal-specific and country-specific determinants influence both negotiation process 
and post-merger integration. Then, we have carried out the research and drawn conclusions 
from broad research inquiry: how do host country characteristics affect the international 
acquisition completion. Altogether, it is an attempt at revisiting and reinforcing the Farmers 
Fox theory through an in-depth analysis (test) of three cases in cross-border inbound deals. 
Though, the earlier-development of this theory was propounded on the basis of single case 
evidence and inadequate theory testing.  
The remaining paper is organized as follows. The outstanding part of Section 1 
presents research motivation, research question, objectives, and scope and contribution. 
Section 2 describes research design with special emphasis to multiple case study method. 
Section 3 discusses key insights from cross-case analysis. Section 4 shows theory testing and 
case proofs.  Section 5 outlines the major research task, that is, revisiting and reinforcing the 
Farmers Fox theory. Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
1.2 Research motivation 
A great extent of previous studies examined cross-border acquisitions through the lens of 
finance, economics and strategic management, while very few studies investigated the 
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phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions in IB field. By and large, academic and industry 
researchers have analyzed stock returns around the announcement, post-merger operating 
performance and integration determinants. It infers that ongoing scholars have significant 
scope to study pre-merger negotiations, determinants of deal completion and influence of 
host country institutional attributes. Indeed, seven tracks that appeared in the cross-border 
M&A stream motivated us to pursue this research. At the outset, foreign market entry choices 
are an important research focus in IB and strategy fields (Chapman 2003; Hopkins 1999). 
First, cross-border M&A stream largely remain underexplored compare to domestic M&As, 
and more theoretical and empirical research is needed for improving the current state of 
literature (Bertrand and Betschinger 2012; Hur et al. 2011; Shimizu et al. 2004). Second, 
there is inadequate research on deal completion in which one can study factors affecting the 
cross-border inbound acquisitions success (Ahammad and Glaister 2013; Reis et al. 2013; 
Zhang et al. 2011). Third, most of the existing literature has built-up on the developed 
economies setting- US and UK (Bertrand and Zuniga 2006) in which deals with emerging 
economies need to be investigated both to support the existing theory and to add new streaks 
to the literature (Barbopoulos et al. 2014; Bertrand and Betschinger 2012; Francis et al. 2014; 
Kim 2009; Malhotra et al. 2011; Zhu 2011). Fourth, M&A stream is one of the prominent 
research areas that attract scholars from various disciplines such as economics, management, 
accounting, sociology, law and politics. However, the field needs to be deeply analyzed 
through creating an “interdisciplinary” environment than that of doing “multidisciplinary 
research” (Bengtsson and Larsson 2012; Cantwell and Brannen 2011). Fifth, a vast quantity 
of M&A research has empirically driven and ignored qualitative research approaches. For 
example, Haleblian et al. (2009) reviewed the M&A research published between 1992 and 
2007 and found that only 3% of research publications out of 167 articles have used case study 
method. We thus adopted the qualitative case study method in our research setting. Sixth, 
most of the existing theories were developed on the basis of advanced country’ behaviour, 
but one should also test of those theories in emerging markets phenomenon and develop new 
theory in the given setting (Hoskisson et al. 2000). 
Finally yet importantly, recent studies have focused on institutional distance, 
economic nationalism, and political behaviour and thereby analyzed how these determinants 
affect cross-border acquisitions completion (Geppert et al. 2013; Lin et al. 2009; Serdar Dinc 
and Erel 2013; Wan and Wong 2009; Zhang and He 2014; Zhang et al. 2011). In a recent 
survey paper, Ferreira et al. (2014) showed bibliometric results for the extant strategy and IB 
studies on M&A research during 1980-2010 period. They mentioned that “institutional theory 
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has been remarkably absent from M&A research …, and suggested that emerging markets 
institutional authorities' behaviour and government intervention in overseas acquisitions” 
could be most relevant for further research. In addition, analysis of deals with emerging 
market country-India is important for several reasons (Mukherji et al. 2013; Peng et al. 2008; 
Reddy et al. 2013). For example, emerging markets provide unique setting (Bruton et al. 
2008) to test existing theories because they characterize growing markets, improving 
economic performance, cheap labor and some extent of liberalized regulations and 
governance standards [high level of politicking, social crime, corruption, erratic nature of 
government officials, and other foreignness issues]. In short, they behave differently from 
developed markets in many aspects such as culture, technology, quality of law, income, 
living standards and status of economy (Stiglitz 2004). Importantly, we found an emergent 
research interest in emerging countries like China and India. For instance, a recent article by 
Xu and Meyer (2013) found that a total of 161 emerging economy-related papers published 
during 2006-10 compare to 99 in 2001-05 (63% overall increase). Their results infer that 
stylish theoretical and empirical research is required in (on) India, which may shed light on 
strategies of emerging market firms include outbound acquisitions, internationalization and 
direct international investments, just to name a few. In sum, we have aimed to accomplish 
research goals that would fairly recognize the high-impact research in management studies 
(Alvesson and Sandberg 2013). 
 
1.3 Research synthesis 
Qualitative case study investigation in M&A stream is scanty, in which the subject has 
largely dominated by quantitative research. At the same time, analyzing cases between 
different borders or cross-border acquisitions require adequate time and expertise, which 
depends upon researcher quality. In this study, we have adopted multi-case research both to 
test existing theories responsible for M&A stream and to build new theory from emerging 
markets phenomenon. Nevertheless, we found very few studies that examine international 
acquisitions involving emerging market enterprises but they largely used empirical research 
tools (Agbloyor et al. 2013; Al Rahahleh and Wei 2012; Chen et al. 2009; Francis et al. 
2014; Malhotra et al. 2011). Indeed, we found a small number of studies that analyze 
international acquisition cases (primary/secondary data) in both developed and emerging 
markets (Geppert et al. 2013; Halsall 2008; Meyer and Altenborg 2007, 2008; Wan and 
Wong 2009). Importantly, there is significant knowledge gap in M&A stream where scholars 
have opportunity to investigate international acquisition process and completion, especially 
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when firms from developed markets wish to acquire firms in developing countries (Bertrand 
and Betschinger 2012; Epstein 2005; Reis et al. 2013; Serdar Dinc and Erel 2013; Zhang et 
al. 2011). Therefore, we have chosen the Asian emerging market-India as a sophisticated 
research setting for many reasons. We have developed three cases in cross-border inbound 
acquisitions hosting India based on archival data, and thereby designed a conjectural 
framework for cross-case analysis. The cases selected in our research meet the criteria of case 
study research, for instance, cases should answer either why/how, or both (Yin 2003). 
 
1.4 Research question 
The objective of research should be a multilevel, multidiscipline “unified” theory (Buckley 
and Lessard 2005:595). Indeed, matching the methodology to the research question is central 
to any research effort (as cited in Nicholson and Kiel 2007). Qualitative researchers 
suggested that formulation of research question is the most crucial phase in studies that 
employ case study research (Tsang 2013; Yin 2003). While supporting this streak, we also 
postulate that a given research question should be accompanied by some research arguments 
that are unexplored in the literature. On the other hand, finding a research gap or formulating 
a research question in M&A subject is really not an easy task due to its massive size and 
extensive coverage of literature since its unveil in the 19th Century (Martynova and 
Renneboog 2008a). Albeit, we found significant knowledge gaps when scholars have started 
drawing attention to the emerging markets behavior and such attention has appreciably risen 
after the special issue publication in the Academy of Management Journal (Hoskisson et al. 
2000). In particular, two another special issues sequel to this, have found that scholars from 
developed and emerging markets are keen to examine different strategies affecting firm 
performance through the lens of different theories, namely resource-based-view, transaction 
cost economics, eclectic paradigm and institutional theory (Wright et al. 2005; Xu and Meyer 
2013). Importantly, recent studies have examined institutional distance, political intervention 
and nationalism in cross-border M&As (Ferreira et al. 2014; Meyer et al. 2009; Reis et al. 
2013), and this research trend/focus will improve and attract other emerging markets scholars 
too. For instance, Meyer et al. (2009) pointed that because of institutional differences “how 
do foreign firms adapt entry strategies when entering emerging countries”. Similarly, Serdar 
Dinc and Erel (2013) raised a research query: “do governments really resist the acquisition of 
domestic companies by foreign companies”. Xu and Meyer (2013) also discussed 
institutional aspects and linking theory to emerging markets context. In sum, we have 
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approached emerging markets through a qualitative case study research that develop better 
sponsorship in formulating the following research question. 
How (does) host country institutional framework influence the cross-border inbound 
acquisition completion focusing the “success of negotiations and the time it requires 
to be finished”? 
The then, in turn 
How (does) national' weak regulatory and legal framework affect overseas inbound 
acquisitions, both referring to “acquirer/target and host country’s sovereign income”? 
Taking forward, the study posits 
Do we need a new theory to explain the statutory behavior of emerging economies 
around inbound investments/acquisitions and its effect on their sovereign revenue? 
 
1.5 Research objectives 
The focal objective of our multi-case study research is to “build new theory”. To accomplish 
this goal, we have set secondary or prerequisite tasks based on extant literature addressing 
cross-border M&As, phenomenon relating to emerging market-India, and the cases chosen 
for research. 
 To examine the host country’s institutional laws that uncover international taxation 
plea in a completed cross-border inbound acquisition. 
 To investigate the impact of financial markets regulations and provisions on border-
crossing inbound deals resulting delayed, then completed or unsuccessful. 
 To study the adverse behavior of public administration and political intervention in 
overseas inbound deals that became delayed, then completed or unsuccessful. 
 To test existing theories propounded in various disciplines while supporting adequate 
case(s) evidences. 
Besides reinforcing the theory, we also suggest testable propositions for initiating further 
research on cross-border M&As, in other emerging market settings. 
 
1.6 Research scope and contribution 
It is worth stating that M&A field is an interdisciplinary event, which allows a scholar to 
study particular knowledge gap with in-depth focus that enriches the literature by focusing on 
different disciplines. The scope of our research is broad that study from the lens of different 
disciplines- economics, corporate finance, strategic management, organization studies, 
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sociology, law, and importantly IB. For example, we have tested sophisticated theories 
propounded in various disciplines like resource-based-view theory, liability of foreignness, 
information asymmetry theory, market efficiency theory, institutional theory and 
organizational learning theory, just to cite a few. Because of the widespread theoretical 
backdrop, our research contribution is significant and vital to the current state of knowledge. 
Thus, we have examined the impact of host country institutional environment (e.g. financial 
markets, and taxation, and political involvement) on cross-border inbound acquisitions for 
various reasons: deals characterize higher valuation, cash payment, acquirer belongs to 
developed country and industry largely controls by public-sector enterprises. We also 
postulate how does weak regulatory system adversely affect a given host country sovereign 
revenue whilst promise benefit to acquirer and/or target firm in overseas inbound deals. 
This is a unique effort of using qualitative case research to analyze the impact of 
institutional determinants on cross-border inbound acquisitions when hosting by an emerging 
market-India. Nevertheless, we are among the few to examine Indian M&A deals (domestic/ 
overseas) through case study research for two reasons: testing existing theory and building 
new theory. Further, it is exceptional in the extensive M&A literature due to interdisciplinary 
setting as well as theory building through new procedure of multi-case research. Therefore, 
contribution of our research is four fold. First, we consider emerging market behaviour of 
India as a potential research setting to study the impact of institutional and legal environment 
on cross-border deals. Second, multi-case investigation enhances the current knowledge on 
pre-merger negotiation (deal completion) when transactions occur between developed and 
developing country, and deals with higher valuation, cash payment, and more government 
control in the industry. Third, we discover new method of multi-case research design both to 
overcome research obstacles (e.g. data collection) and to study the emerging markets 
phenomenon. Lastly, we propose new theory and suggest propositions for enhancing current 
knowledge and initiating further research on ‘impact of institutional distance and political 
intervention in cross-border deals’, which in turn should explain the ‘host or home country 
economic benefits’. In addition, findings of the research hold strategic implications for 
multinational managers, economic policy, legal framework and society. 
 
2 Research design: Multiple case study method 
Unlike empirical studies, qualitative research has been markedly a different methodological 
rhythm for various reasons including rigor and quality. Indeed, qualitative researchers review 
exhaustive literature in the given field and thereby strengthen research argument. Qualitative 
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research is a form of scientific inquiry, which aims at understanding “complex social 
processes … and characterizes organizational processes, dynamics, and describes social 
interactions and elicits individual attitudes and preferences” (Curry et al. 2009:1442-1443). It 
is helpful in business research to analyze critical issues that remain unclear in quantitative 
research (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). However, it has been underutilized in the 
management discipline. For instance, regrettably, IB is still depicted as an “empirically 
driven, a theoretical field that fails to go much beyond the descriptive” (Shenkar 2004:165). 
We therefore chose a qualitative case study research to accomplish research goals. 
Case study research (CSR) aims to investigate and analyze the unique nature of 
organizational environment in a real-life setting, based on single or multiple cases that 
carefully bounded by time and place (Conrad and Serlin 2006; Miles and Huberman 1994; 
Stake 1995; Yin 1994, 2003). While commenting on sampling, Yin (1994) suggested that 
case researchers may use single case or multiple cases that depends on the purpose of 
research whether theory is testing or theory is developing. The problem of single cases is 
limitations in generalizability and several information-processing biases (Eisenhardt 1989). 
The author also described that case studies provide rich and in-depth evidence to build 
theories, and to offer theoretical constructs and testable propositions in an emergent research 
area, subsequent studies have advanced his idea (Bengtsson and Larsson 2012; Eisenhardt 
and Graebner 2007; Hoon 2013). Whereas, theory building from multiple cases typically 
yield more robust, generalizable and testable than single-case research … “theory-building 
research using cases typically answers questions addressing ‘how’ and ‘why’ in unexplored 
research areas” (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). It has become an increasingly popular and 
relevant research strategy in business management studies (Hoon 2013). In sum, we found 
case study method is the best-recognized and highly motivated approach that allows a 
researcher to deeply-study and ‘lookup’ the critical and complicated business transactions, for 
instance, failure M&A deals in business discipline. For example, Fang et al. (2004), and 
Meyer and Altenborg (2007, 2008) analyzed the failed merger between two Scandinavian 
telecom companies: Telia of Sweden and Telenor of Norway. Wan and Wong (2009) 
analyzed an unsuccessful takeover of Unocal (USA) by CNOOC's (China). Conversely, few 
studies examined multiple cases using various theoretical frameworks (Geppert et al. 2013; 
Liu and Zhang 2014; Riad and Vaara 2011). 
At the outset, the extant social sciences and management' theoretical concepts and 
empirical literature has been largely determined on the basis of western (developed) 
economies institutional context. In the recent past, many researchers argued that the western 
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theories are inadequate to study the emerging markets phenomenon, described the problems 
relating to data collection, data analysis and theory development. We also (experienced) 
found that major problems exist in emerging markets (e.g. India, Pakistan) accountable for 
data collection, especially primary data (interview/survey) (Dieleman and Sachs 2008; 
Dhanaraj and Khanna 2011; Hoskisson et al. 2000; Malik and Kotabe 2009). The quality of 
either qualitative research or quantitative research depends upon rigor (or, approachability) of 
the research carried out by the researcher in a given setting (Yin 1994, 2003). 
In sum, qualitative case researchers argued that sampling cases or unit of analysis 
should offer sophisticated research setting to test extant theory as well as to improve/build 
theory. Indeed, we understood that multi-case research design provides a great extent of 
theoretical backdrop than single case environment. We therefore adopted multi-case research 
(three sampling cases), and developed some ‘special’ tasks to build new theory as well as to 
enhance the knowledge on M&A field. 
 
2.1 Sampling cases 
The focal research question in the study is - does a host-country’s weak regulatory system 
benefit both the acquirer and the target firm in cross-border (inbound) acquisitions? 
Captivating this, we derive two equated sub-research questions, i.e. why and how, as 
discussed in case study research design that single or multiple cases should answer both of 
them (Yin 2003). In our setting, why were cross-border inbound acquisitions deals delayed or 
called-off? In the same vein, how does host country’s regulatory system affect the acquirer 
and the target firm involved in cross-border inbound transactions? To examine the research 
questions, we use interdisciplinary theoretical background. Following the pattern matching 
observations of cases, we have selected three deals, which were particularly affected by the 
host country’s institutional laws refer to mergers, acquisitions, listing norms and international 
taxation. The cases include Vodafone-Hutchison tax litigation deal and Bharti Airtel-MTN 
broken deal in telecom sector, and Vedanta-Cairn India delayed deal in oil and gas business. 
Thus, the common pattern in all three cases is regulatory laws and provisions, and political 
intervention. To the best of our media knowledge, two of three cases were highly represented 
in all leading TV channels (e.g. CNBC, TV18, and ET Now) and finance-related daily news 
(e.g. Economic Times, Business Standard, Business Line, and Financial Express). Further, 
they had appeared in international finance-related dailies include Financial Times, Reuters, 
and leading accounting agencies such as KPMG, Deloitte, and other host-country registered 
13 
 
trading brokers’ official reports. Finally yet importantly, one of three cases had been long-
time awaited and challenged tax petition in the apex court of given economy. 
Moreover, emergent research on cross-border M&As “completion” in emerging 
markets (Muehlfeld et al. 2012; Zhang and He 2014; Zhang et al. 2011), and economic 
nationalism and institutional factors around international direct investments (Dikova et al. 
2010; Serdar Dinc and Erel 2013), have been stimulated us to investigate ‘complex, 
intercultural, institutional and cross-border negotiations’ both for new knowledge creation 
and for theory development. In fact, studying merger/acquisition failure deals in the 
international setting provide unique setup to perform in-depth and systematic analysis of 
single case or across cases. For example, Fang et al. (2004), and Meyer and Altenborg (2007, 
2008) explored the problems of incompatible strategies (national cultures) and disintegrating 
effects of equality in foreign mergers using a failed merger between two state-owned telecom 
firms in the Scandinavian countries, i.e., Telia of Sweden and Telenor of Norway. Wan and 
Wong (2009) investigated the economic impact of political barriers in which they deeply 
analyzed the changes in stock price of other US oil firms due to CNOOC’s (China) 
unsuccessful takeover of Unocal (USA). Similarly, we have been critically examined three 
cross-border inbound acquisitions in light of the host country institutional setup as well as 
acquiring firms’ behaviour.  
Unlike previous studies, the specialty of deals in our research include (i) a deal that 
was completed, but litigated for long-time in the sampling country’s jurisdiction due to 
international taxes, and succeed in favor of the acquirer, (ii) a deal that was extended merger 
talks in the first round, renegotiated in the second-round, and then called-off due to deal 
structure, national identity and dual listing norms, and (iii) a deal that was delayed and slowly 
materialized because of contract laws and open offers issues. In particular, two deals were 
belonging to telecom business and the remaining was associated with oil and gas industry. A 
common thread in all three inbound-acquisition deals was weak institutional laws, procedures 
and erratic government officials’ behaviour. In essence, big-capitalists, politicians, and 
government closely influence telecom and capital goods industries compared to other 
businesses, which usually captures a great deal of asymmetric information. In this vein, Wan 
and Wong (2009) mentioned that ‘barriers are particularly high in energy sector but low in 
sectors not involving critical infrastructure’. We strongly believe that the sampling cases 
provide rich setting to study the institutional laws, political intervention and government 
involvement in inbound direct investment deals.  
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The main characteristics of sampling cases include (a) cross-border inbound 
acquisitions involving India as host country, (b) two cases related to telecom business and 
remaining case related to oil and gas exploration, (c) one case found to be successful out of 
two delayed-cases, and remaining case legally challenged after deal completion, (d) all cases 
were publicly attentive (paying special attention), and (e) all cases injected by host country’s 
institutional, legal, political and financial markets environment. 
 
2.2 Sampling time 
The sampling time of cases is as follows. 
 Case 1: Starting date December 2006 – Closing date March 2012, then the total 
sampling time represents 64 months (backward search and observation). 
 Case 2: Starting date February 2008 – Closing date November 2009, then the total 
sampling time equals to 22 months (backward search). 
 Case 3: Starting date August 2010 – Closing date December 2011, then the total 
sampling time represents to 17 months (forward search and observation). 
Where, starting date means when the deal announcement was first appeared in any one of 
the national finance dailies (e.g. Economic Times, Business Line, Financial Express or 
Business Standard). It is to be noted that news might have appeared before acquirer made a 
formal announcement. Closing date denotes when the negative news/final decision was 
published in any one of the above finance dailies. To be safe from our side, we check the 
news with respected company’s web news, notices or reports (e.g. annual report). In fact, we 
have created “Google Alerts” to get the news immediately about specific deal as soon as it 
appears on the World Wide Web. Thus, the interval time of news delivery is “daily”. Total 
sampling time represents ‘five years and four months”. 
 
2.3 Case study protocol 
The idea of case study protocol is to record a set of actions and procedures adopted in the 
given case method, which holds trustworthiness of findings. For example, Yin (1994:41) 
suggested that researchers should develop a well-considered set of actions, rather than using 
‘‘subjective’’ judgments. It helps like an acknowledgement to the mail, particularly in 
qualitative research environment (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010). We have recorded every event 
of the doctoral research cautiously in electronic files, for example, sampling cases, case 
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development, sampling time, data source, data collection, case writing and case publication, 
among others (Appendix A). 
 
3 Cross-case analysis: Key discussions 
Based on the extant literature and multiple case analyses, we would wish to discuss key 
factors determining the success or failure of an international acquisition. However, we notice 
that some findings are common across nations irrespective of developed or developing status 
of the host country while few observations are “special” if acquisitions are hosted by 
emerging economies like India. Therefore, acquiring firm' managers and M&A advisory 
firms should pay more attention to those special factors when target firm is associated to the 
developing nation. We have discussed both common and special determinants in four tasks: 
organizational issues, deal characteristics, due diligence and external barriers (Figure 1). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3.1 Organizational issues 
Earlier researchers suggested that deal completion also influenced by firm-specific variables 
like relevant business, firm size, management expertise and previous acquisition experience. 
We support the theoretical notion that overseas acquisition success not only depends upon 
firm size and related business, but also depends upon firm’s previous acquisition experience 
in the related business, market and level. For example, Bharti Airtel-MTN telecom deal has 
been called-off due to both external and internal factors. The internal factors such as 
international outlook of the firm and prior deal experience might cause the deal to be 
delayed-uncompleted. Besides deep pockets and business expertise in telecom business, the 
deal became unsuccessful due to lack of professionalism in deal making. On the other hand, 
Vedanta-Cairn India deal has delayed, but later completed after obtaining all government 
approvals. We found that deals also become delay if acquiring firm has no experience in the 
relevant business of the target firm. However, diversified business groups achieve deal 
success due to their conglomerate diversification, size of the group and availability of cash 
reserves. It infers that big companies can sustain their life both in related and unrelated 
businesses. More importantly, we argue that firms participating in overseas acquisitions 
involving emerging economies will - gain relevant experience in deal making, acquire 
additional skills to complete proposed deals, and learn from failure- and success-of 
negotiations. Further, the experience gained in emerging economies would positively result in 
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future acquisitions performance. In sum, acquiring firm that has prior acquisition experience, 
international outlook, related business and deep pockets possibly will record the success-
mark in subsequent deals, for example, Vodafone-Hutchison deal. In this case, we suggest 
that because of international outlook, management expertise, organizational learning and 
prior overseas-deal experience, Vodafone has successfully completed the Hutchison 
acquisition to prepare for entry in India, and win over the tax plea even after long delay in 
judgment. Nevertheless, organizations do not stop their learning due to success or failure, but 
they learn and gain knowledge continuously to overcome various obstacles in the future. 
 
3.2 Deal-specific issues 
Few studies suggested that deal structure in terms of type of deal, payment structure and 
M&A advisors expertise affect the deal completion. We would wish to answer why (how) 
deal structure determine the deal success? From the case analysis, we found that deal 
structure has largely been discussed as “ownership strategy” in finance than “general 
strategy” in strategic management or IB. We have two reasons for this, firstly how much 
percentage of equity should acquire to gain control over target firm? Secondly, what payment 
mode (cash, stock or both) should adopt by acquiring firm without diluting ownership and 
control benefits? Further, payment mode is influenced by accounting and taxation laws in the 
given host economy (Epstein 2005). Logically, if acquiring firm wants to hold full control 
over target firm, then it should pay cash to the target firm shareholders. Assuming that the 
acquiring firm paid or issued stock to target firm shareholders, then one can see the dilution 
in ownership that leads to question–who has better control over the target firm? Who will 
enjoy firm earnings? For example, Bharti Airtel-MTN telecom deal has uncompleted due to 
deal structure. Here, both firms wanted to control the post-merger firm by making the 
company as dual listing entity in India and South Africa. Besides dual listing benefits, both 
firms will face agency and information asymmetry problems. Because of dual listing impact, 
payment options have changed and thereby attracted regulatory obstacles (e.g. open offers) 
and other issues (e.g. political intervention). If they could have perceived acquisition strategy 
than merger, the deal would have completed with better ownership and control mechanism, 
cash payment, non-compete agreement, etc. Conversely, because of prior international deal 
experience in developed economies, Vodafone has escaped from paying capital gain taxes to 
the Indian government after acquiring Hutchison equity stake in CGP Investments, thus 
controlled the Hutchison-Essar Ltd. From these observations, we suggest that good deals save 
significant amount on transaction cost, while bad deals create numerous inherent problems 
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that lead to break the pre-merger negotiations or post-merger integration. Following the 
Vodafone strategy, Vedanta Resources has obtained controlling rights in Cairn India through 
acquiring Cairn Energy’s equity stake. Hence, Vedanta could not escape from paying taxes to 
the government, because of greenfield investment made by Cairn Energy when entered India. 
Finally, we suggest that acquiring firm managers and M&A advisory firms should aware of 
deal characteristics such as ownership and control benefits, payment mode, non-compete 
agreement, cross-listing, break-up fee, and so forth of qualitative attributes. In addition, 
M&A advisors should work toward deal completion that leads to obtain significant amount of 
advisory fee and commission. 
 
3.3 Due diligence issues 
In our survey and reading, we understood that due diligence issues also determine the success 
of deals at domestic and overseas settings. Thus, due diligence refers to examine the business 
of target firm for various reasons include capital structure, ownership rights, product profile, 
contingent contracts, legal disputes, taxation disputes and financial performance (Epstein 
2005). In the given research, we noticed that Vedanta-Cairn India deal has attracted the 
attention of due diligence problems, especially royalty payment controversy between Cairn 
Energy, ONGC and Ministry of Petroleum. Further, deal had delayed, because ONGC has 
pre-emptive rights in one of the oil fields owned by Cairn India. For the reason that, Cairn 
Energy has strived to obtain approval from the respective government departments and the 
petroleum ministry. We therefore suggest that acquiring firm managers should not exploit the 
funds at the expense of shareholders commitment. In other words, M&A advisory team and 
due diligence team of acquitting firm should inspect and make out clear any issues before 
finalizing, agreeing and transferring the payment. 
 
3.4 Country-specific determinants 
Accessible literature on direct international investments and overseas M&As performed in 
various national settings found that economic, financial, legal, regulatory, governmental, 
political, cultural and geographical factors affect both pre-acquisition completion and post-
acquisition integration. In particular, host country’s government authorities behaviour, strong 
political institutions cum political stability, rule of law, control of corruption and white collar 
crimes and regulatory quality, together create favorable institutional environment that allow 
foreign firms to invest in the given economy (Reis et al. 2013; Stein and Daude 2001). At the 
same time, it lets foreign firms to reduce transaction cost during market entry process. Reis et 
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al. (2013) suggested that developed country MNCs have to face institutional difficulties (law, 
corruption, crime, political intervention) when making deals with target firm located in 
developing country. For instance, a typical case in the Indian court system would take 
roughly 20 years to make final decision (as cited in Armour and Lele 2008). Regarding our 
research, we have examined foreign acquisitions at the acquisition process or deal completion 
stage. For example, two out of three cases: Vodafone-Hutchison and Vedanta-Cairn India 
deals have faced external difficulties such as underdeveloped laws, legal formalities, erratic 
behaviour of government officials and political intervention. This streak supports the 
empirical finding of Reis et al. (2013) in which both Vedanta and Vodafone were based in 
developed country-UK and then invested in developing economy-India. Owing to 
international outlook, prior deal experience and management expertise, Vodafone and 
Vedanta have triumphed over the regulatory hurdles and then successfully completed their 
deals. By and large, Bharti Airtel-MTN deal has also been faced severe institutional hurdles 
such as open offers program, dual listing norms and shareholder rights. The deal has been 
called-off “twice” and thereby companies have decided not to renegotiate in the future. In this 
vein, we are not convinced that cultural distance between India and South Africa really 
influences the merger negotiations (since two countries have good economic and social 
relations). If so, the deal should cancel in the first-innings. Due to home country’s strict 
regulations, Bharti Airtel has acquired Kuwait-based Zain Telecom that resulted in gaining 
business opportunity over African market. When we deeply study the cases, we found that 
government officials’ erratic nature and ruling political party influence would be more in 
foreign inward deals that characterize higher bid value, listed company, and cash payment. 
We postulate that the strong reason behind such influence is “personal financial and/or non-
financial benefit”, which is behind the screen, under the table. Because of institutional 
dichotomous, inward acquisitions, usually get delay and/or break without making any public 
announcement. Lastly, bidding managers and M&A advisors should give more attention to 
host country’s ruling political party and other institutional factors when making long-term 
investment in countries like India and China. While, geographical factors such as distance 
and culture do not explain the sampling cases. 
 
4 Theory testing and case illustrations  
Strategy, IB and finance researchers explored that a firm reports significant growth while 
choosing a corporate inorganic model compared to an organic model. For instance, growth 
can be seen in terms of market share, profitability, competitive advantage, economies of 
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scale, new market experience, and so forth of synergies. The model that we indentified in our 
research is an ‘acquisition’ and it is a cross-border deal. In addition, it is evidenced that U.S. 
and UK based, and other developed-country multinationals have internationalized their 
operations, corporate ownership, and products and services through mergers/acquisitions. 
Similarly, recent research on emerging economies showed that emerging-market firms are 
being adopting and thereby following both past and current strategies of developed-country 
MNCs. 
This section aims to test 17 theories propounded in different business research 
disciplines, for instance, Caves and Hymer’s theory of FDI, Dunning’s eclectic theory, 
Uppsala theory of firm internationalization, Penrose’s RBV theory, North’s institutional 
theory, Zaheer’s theory of liability of foreignness, Jensen and Meckling’s agency theory, and 
Fama’s market efficiency theory, just to cite a few (Table 1). We also look up an important 
theorem “learning-by-doing” in organization studies. We strongly suggest that special tasks 
such as pre-testing (Reddy et al. 2014a), and revisiting post-testing task and reinforcing 
theoretical constructs in this paper will improve the current knowledge refers to the impact of 
institutional distance on cross-border M&As completion. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
5 Farmers Fox theory: Revisited and reinforced 
As pointed out in earlier sections, few recent studies have tested and advanced the knowledge 
on resource-based view, transaction cost economics, agency and institutional theories (Xu 
and Meyer 2013). Albeit, scholars have suggested that emerging markets are a unique setting, 
which offer the ability to obtain fresh insights to expand theory (Bruton et al. 2008), and to 
build new theory and testable propositions. For example, Wright et al. (2005:24) suggested 
an important research argument: “to what extent do problems arising from institutional 
differences increase transaction and agency costs and lead to exit by foreign entrants?” 
Similarly, Xu and Meyer (2013) also stressed the importance of studying the institutional 
perspectives in foreign market entry strategies in emerging markets whilst linking theory to 
the context. Further, recent papers published in leading finance and IB journals have 
discussed the significance of institutional distance and economic nationalism in cross-border 
M&As (Barbopoulos et al. 2014; Hur et al. 2011; Reis et al. 2013; Serdar Dinc and Erel 
2013; Wan 2005; Wang 2013). We therefore realize that new theories developing based on 
emerging markets phenomenon should draw more attention to the institutional environment 
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and its impact on internationalization process. In this vein, Hur et al. (2011) tested the 
hypothesis “the quality of host countries’ institutions positively affects the cross-border 
M&A inflows”. Nagano (2013) also tested the hypothesis “an enhancement of IPR protection 
law in the host-country encourages inward greenfield FDI and that of SHR protection law 
promotes cross-border M&A”. Reis et al. (2013) propounded few testable propositions in 
light of institutional distance and cross-border M&As completion.   
With this in mind, we establish a triangular association between systemic multi-case 
analysis, extant CB-M&A literature and theory testing. Before introducing new theory, it is 
the case study protocol to disclose what missing threads are in the existing literature. We 
found few interesting research questions, but largely unexplored in emerging markets 
phenomenon that raised new avenues to enhance the literature in IB, strategy and economics. 
For example, Lucas (1990) argued “why does not capital flow from developed (rich) to 
developing (poor) countries”, and developed his theorem using Indian setting. Lucas 
postulated that because of weak regulatory laws (e.g. investor protection, financial 
disclosures, ownership rights) and their poor implementation in developing countries, there 
were no overseas capital flows from rich to poor countries. Lucas mainly argued that 
sovereign risk
1
 (e.g. political) and asymmetric information will be higher in poor countries 
due to improper laws and less regulatory enforcement that negatively affect foreign inflows 
when coming from rich nations. Further, Lucas also discussed about external advantages of 
human capital (labor), technology transfer and imperfect market conditions. While 
empirically testing it, Alfaro et al. (2008) considered a sample of 50 countries during 1971-
1998 period and suggested that institutional quality has been a major determinant explaining 
the Lucas paradox. In such cases, we argue that poor countries are losing significant 
economic (e.g. taxes) and non-economic incentives (e.g. skills and expertise) due to their 
erratic nature of administration, political intervention and unsecured investor rights. Here, the 
missing link is that besides weak governance, poor countries are allowing foreign investment, 
but severely losing economic benefits like revenue taxes, capital gains taxes and border taxes. 
This streak seems to be an old argument but no previous study postulated that a given 
country’s government needs facing economic (revenue) risk because of weak institutional 
laws. Then, we wish to develop new theory based on research question- how (does) a poor 
county hosting foreign investment' undergo economic loss while profiting to host party 
(acquirer or target)? Indeed, we acknowledge some important arguments raised by previous 
scholars that will also support the research question. For instance, Reis et al. (2013) 
developed few theoretical constructs explaining how institutional distance (government, 
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political and social) affects the likelihood of completing an overseas deal. We propound this 
as “Farmers Fox theory”, which postulates 
“a given country’s weak (loopholes in) financial and tax regulatory system benefits 
both the acquirer and the target firm in cross-border acquisitions based on two assumptions: 
first, one must have some experience within the given economic and regulatory environment 
or some kind of alliance with a local firm; second, other one should new to the economy 
where the target firm is registered or associated. At the same time, this economic behavior 
adversely affects that country’s fiscal income or revenue”. 
In other words, a country that characterizes weak institutional laws, high level of 
corruption, severe politicking (ruling political party intervention), hosting foreign direct 
investment or inviting foreign MNCs through acquisition method may have to record loss of 
such economic incentives like international taxes, cross-listing fee, and taxes on overseas 
revenues. In that case, acquirer and/or target should enjoy such economic benefits without 
paying it to the sovereign of the host country. It means that there is economic loss (profit) to 
the host country (acquirer, target, or both). In fact, economic loss will be more if acquirer or 
target firm is associated with developed country. Albeit, we acknowledge some important 
limitations that should be checked by the future scholars before testing this theory (refer to 
Reddy et al. 2014a:61-62). 
 
5.1 Building testable propositions 
We suggest testable propositions for future research in cross-border M&A stream, emerging 
markets, which will advance the current knowledge on foreign acquisitions when a researcher 
empirically tests on a large sample. The constructs developed on the basis of research 
argument that overseas inbound investment deals in the form of acquisitions or mergers will 
be delay, then become success or fail because of two important reasons, which responsible 
for host country: (i) erratic behavior of sovereign (government officials, ruling political 
party), and (ii) weak institutional laws relating to financial markets and taxation. Following 
this streak, the proposed theory pointed that acquirer or target firm will enjoy economic 
benefits whilst host country government will result in economic loss that is supposed to be 
lawful revenue. 
Based on our understanding and research experience, we would wish to present what 
a weak regulatory system is along with some evidences responsible for international 
organizations such as the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, The Heritage 
Foundation, the Transparency International, just to cite a few. In this vein, Lucas (1990) also 
22 
 
postulated that developing countries characterize poor economy and do not have sound 
institutional laws relating to investor protection, intellectual property rights, ownership 
pattern, listing procedure, and so forth of legal, administration and policy-implementation 
issues. In addition, few scholars have argued that developing economies (so called emerging 
markets) do not have sophisticated laws relating to anti-corruption, crime, social welfare, 
judgment delivery, etc. Most economic and law scholars suggested that corruption is one of 
the major economic barriers adversely affecting the economic development of a country, for 
example, wasteful of government spending and discourages foreign inward investment (Tanzi 
and Davoodi 1998). According to Transparency International
2
-CPI report-2011, Russia found 
to be most corrupt country (2.4) among BRIC group, followed by India (3.1), China (3.6) and 
Brazil (3.8). In particular, the degree of corruption in India has declined in terms of CPI from 
2.7 in 2001 to 3.1 in 2011. The World Economic Forum (WEF) defined financial 
development in its report Financial Development Report (WEF-FDR 2012)- “as the factors, 
policies, and institutions that lead to effective financial intermediation and markets, as well as 
deep and broad access to capital and financial services” (p. xiii). It is measured by factors 
such as size, depth, access, and the efficiency and stability of a financial system, which 
includes its markets, intermediaries, range of assets, institutions and regulations (p. 4). The 
report developed based on seven pillars such as institutional environment, business 
environment, financial stability, banking financial services, non-banking financial services, 
financial markets and financial access. To our research, institutional environment refers to 
financial sector liberalization, corporate governance, legal and regulatory issues, and contract 
enforcement. The rank for India based on Financial Development Index found to be 40 in 
2012 from 36 in 2011 compared to other BRIC economies, Brazil (32 from 30), China (23 
from 19) and Russia (39). It infers that lesser the rank the more the development. For 
example, Hong Kong secured 1st rank, followed by US, UK and so forth. In terms of 
institutional environment, India placed 56 compared to Brazil (46), China (35), and Russia 
(59). In particular, the Heritage Foundation publishes Index of Economic Freedom and for 
the year 2012 report, it has included a sample of 184 countries (THF and WSJ 2012). The 
objective of the index is “to evaluate the rule of law, the intrusiveness of government, 
regulatory efficiency, and the openness of markets”. It usually grade and rank based on 10 
pillars of freedom such as Property Rights, Freedom from Corruption, Fiscal Freedom, 
Government Spending, Business Freedom, Labor Freedom, Monetary Freedom, Trade 
Freedom, Investment Freedom, and Financial Freedom. It reported that India ranked by 123, 
Brazil (99), China (138) and Russia (144). 
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An official reference of Doing Business 2012/2013 Report, a copublication of The 
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, presented quantitative indicators on 
business environment and regulations covered for 185 countries (The World Bank and IFC 
2013). The report computes an index value on the basis of 11 topics such as starting a 
business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, 
resolving insolvency, and employing workers. The given economy, India was found to a 
lower middle-income category and its rank for easy of doing business somewhat improved by 
seven points from 139 in 2011 to 132 in 2012 and 2013, which can be compared to Brazil 
(126 to 130), China (91) and Russia (120 to 112). Further, indicators are as follows: starting a 
business (166 to 173), dealing with construction permits (181 to 182), getting electricity (98 
to 105), registering property (97 to 94), getting credit (40 to 23), protecting investors (46 to 
49), paying taxes (147 to 152), trading across borders (109 to 127), enforcing contracts (182 
to 184) and resolving insolvency (128 to 116). For instance, to enforce a contract one should 
wait at least 1420 days compared to Brazil (731), China (406) and Russia (281 to 270) and 
get approval from 46 departments (procedures). Further, India ranked 166 for starting a 
business when compared to Brazil (120 to 121), China (151) and Russia (111 to 101). On the 
other hand, the World Economic Forum also publishes Global Competitiveness Report every 
year in which it defined competitiveness as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that 
determine the level of productivity of a country. Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 
computes based on the 12 pillars of competitiveness include institutions, infrastructure, 
macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, 
goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, 
technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. For the year 
2013-14 Global Competitiveness Report (WEF-GCR 2013), India found to be factor-driven 
economy out of 38 economies in factor-driven group (other two groups include efficiency-
driven and innovation-driven). Based on the sample of 148 countries, India ranked by 60 for 
competitiveness, Brazil (56), China (29), and Russia (64). In case of institutions, 
macroeconomic environment, and financial market development, India ranked 72, 110, 19 
compared to Brazil (80, 75, 50), China (47, 10, 54), and Russia (121, 19, 121). The above 
indicators suggested that India, somehow, improved the economic performance but largely 
affected by weak institutional framework including higher levels of corruption. 
The major theoretical foundation is that “in a given period, when a country’s 
regulatory system fails to improve in line with similar group of countries, or fails to amend 
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specific rules and guidelines for a public good, and when a system is highly corrupted by the 
known political instability and bureaucrats inefficiency, together leads to delay or break both 
public and business-purpose legal procedures–is described as weak regulatory system”; and 
this institutional dichotomy attribute adversely affects government fiscal income whilst 
benefiting other stakeholders (as mentioned in Reddy et at. 2014a:62). 
Herewith, propositions are redefined as follows. Firstly, we derive few insights on the 
behavior of ruling political party and ministries who are in service around cross-border 
inbound acquisition announcements. In our research, we found that two out of three cases 
(Bharti Airtel-MTN and Vedanta-Cairn India) have interfered by service ministries and ruling 
political party officials. It is observed that they usually involve if an overseas inbound 
acquisition characterizes high bid value and cash payment. In fact, the level of intervention 
will be more if deal found to be higher valuation, cash payment, acquiring firm is operating 
from developed country, and the industry is largely accounted for government-owned 
companies. It is central that many industries in India are controlled by public-sector 
undertakings, for instance, oil, gas, petroleum, power, railways, telecommunications, and so 
forth. Further, ownership in public and private limited companies is greatly owned by family 
members. We found that Bharti Airtel-MTN deal valued about US$23 billion and Vedanta-
Cairn India deal valued about US$8.67 billion. While supporting politicking attribute, 
Chairman of Bharti Airtel and top-level managers of MTN have had negotiation with ruling 
political party officials, telecom ministry and other bureaucratic administrators. Besides, 
Chairman of Vedanta Resources also met officials who have control on government approval 
issues relating to Cairn India deal. The common finding is that all three deals were bigger in 
terms of deal value, which influenced by ruling party politicians for their self-benefit (e.g. 
corruption). With this consistency, we put forward our proposition for encouraging research 
on the market for overseas investments and acquisitions around political uncertainty, host 
country’s domestic elections. 
Proposition 1.1 Host country’s ruling political party and respected service ministries 
interfere in foreign inward acquisitions or investments that characterize high bid value, cash 
payment. 
Proposition 1.2 Host country’s ruling political party and respected service ministries 
intervention will be ‘more active’ in foreign inward acquisitions or investments when flowing 
from developed countries that characterize high bid value, cash payment. 
Proposition 1.3 Host country’s ruling political party and respected service ministries 
intervention will be ‘more active’ in foreign inward acquisitions or investments that 
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characterize high bid value, if that industry is largely controlled by government-owned or 
public-sector enterprises. 
In addition to the ruling political party and respected service ministries interfere, a 
given host country’s government officials and respected service institutions behavior also 
influence the deal completion. It is common practice in any country that government officials 
(e.g. department of revenue, central board of direct taxes) and regulatory authorities receive 
applications regarding overseas investment, and thereby responsible for inspecting and 
approving such proposals. Interestingly, we found that all three deals have injected by the 
erratic behavior of regulatory agencies and governmental officials. For example, Vodafone-
Hutchison deal had litigated for roughly five years, and then finally Vodafone win over the 
tax plea case in the apex court. Conversely, Vedanta-Cairn India deal had been delayed due 
to open offers program under the SEBI’s takeover code3 and Cairn Energy’s production 
sharing contract with public-sector undertaking of ONGC (of course, royalty payments), and 
then finally completed after 16months of acquisition announcement. Further, we found that 
institutional officers behave intermittently in overseas inward acquisitions featuring higher 
bid value, cash payment, and it will be more if an acquirer belongs to developed country and 
the industry greatly controls by public-sector undertakings. Following this, we build our next 
proposition for initiating new research on institutional distance (e.g. working culture among 
government departments) around overseas acquisition announcements. 
Proposition 2.1 Host country’s government officials and respected service institutions 
show erratic behavior in foreign inward acquisitions or investments that characterize high bid 
value, cash payment. 
Proposition 2.2 Host country’s government officials and respected service 
institutions' erratic behavior will be ‘more’ in foreign inward acquisitions or investments 
when flowing from developed countries that characterize high bid value, cash payment. 
Proposition 2.3 Host country’s government officials and respected service 
institutions' erratic behavior will be ‘more’ in foreign inward acquisitions or investments that 
characterize high bid value, if that industry is largely controlled by government-owned or 
public-sector enterprises. 
Based on the above constructs, one might argue that border-crossing inward deals 
usually take more time compared to the actual time required for government approval. In 
other words, deals featuring higher valuation become delay due to improper laws (e.g. cross-
listing, open offers, ownership rights, investor protection, accounting standards). In effect, 
inconsistent behavior of government officials affects such deals. In some instances, such 
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deals require more time for obtaining sovereign approval, when the investment is coming 
from developed country. This is found to be true in our case research. For instance, Bharti 
Airtel and MTN Group could have created a consolidated entity if the Indian government has 
legal update on dual listing or cross listing. In a realistic nature, no government wanted to 
lose their control on any business or trade. Hence, Indian government has deregulated many 
industrial policies and thereby disinvested significant number of public sector undertakings. 
For example, Vedanta acquired full control on Bharat Alluminium Company Limited, which 
was a loss-making unit, and then turned to be a profit-making unit after few years of 
integration. In this vein, we found an interesting finding- an overseas deal characterizes 
higher bid value, cash payment, becomes delay if that business is largely proclaimed by 
government enterprises. Though, such deals require more time when an acquirer comes from 
developed country. We found that Vodafone-Hutchison and Vedanta-Cairn India deals 
(including legal issues) severely delayed, and then became success, because both acquiring 
firms registered in an advanced country-UK. To the best of our information, Vodafone-
Hutchison was one of the worst long-time delayed cross-country deals in the world economy. 
The deal initiated in December 2006, announced in the media in February-2007, completed in 
May-2007, tax authorities filed a petition in the given country’s state jurisdiction [...] and 
finally, Supreme Court of India provided the judgment in January-2012. In sum, the 
transaction has consumed in the account of Vodafone approximately 62 months. On the other 
hand, firstly, Bharti Airtel wanted to merge with South African-based MTN Group. The deal 
had delayed and then cancelled during two-round negotiations (2008-2009) because of 
regulatory hurdles that largely controlled by the SEBI and the Ministry of Finance. For 
instance, the hurdles refer to dual listing norms and complex deal structure involving open 
offers. The reality of the case lies here- “the given country’s regulatory system does not 
define what dual listing is”. With these insightful evidences, we suggest a set of constructs 
for further investigation on “deal announcement to deal completion (number of days)” 
between domestic and overseas acquisitions in developed and developing nations. 
Proposition 3.1 Cross-border inward acquisitions (time to be required to get approval 
from the government) delay, then complete or break due to weak institutional laws relating to 
investor protection, cross-listing and intellectual property rights, and institutional officials 
erratic behavior, if such deals characterize higher valuation. 
Proposition 3.2 Cross-border inward acquisitions expense more time in obtaining 
approvals from necessary government departments and such deals delay, then complete or 
break due to weak institutional laws relating to investor protection, cross-listing, and 
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intellectual property rights and institutional officials erratic behavior, if that deals 
characterize high bid value, investment is flowing from developed countries. 
Proposition 3.3 Cross-border inward acquisitions (time to be required to get approval 
from the government) delay, then complete or break due to weak institutional laws relating to 
investor protection, cross-listing and intellectual property rights, and institutional officials 
erratic behavior, if such deals characterize high bid value, industry is largely controlled by 
government-owned firms. 
Proposition 3.4 Cross-border inward acquisitions expense more time in obtaining 
approvals from necessary government departments and such deals delay, then complete or 
break due to weak institutional laws relating to investor protection, cross-listing and 
intellectual property rights, and institutional officials erratic behavior, if that deals 
characterize high bid value, investment is flowing from developed countries and industry is 
largely controlled by government-owned enterprises. 
Following the previous argument, we explain how an acquisition cost behaves due to 
delay in deal completion or due to deal unsuccessful. Acquiring a publicly-listed firm result 
in more acquisition cost than that of acquiring a privately-held firm. Indeed, acquiring a firm 
in foreign country also result in significant higher costs (e.g. border taxes, legal fee, 
registration fee, advisory fee, corporate gains tax, etc.) compared to costs involved in 
domestic deals. In our case research, all three deals were overseas inbound deals connected to 
India, which was a host country. In a practical sense, acquiring firm is responsible, bearing a 
great extent of acquisition cost that ranges between 2 and 5 per cent of the deal value. Of 
course, this cost has direct association with deal completion process that is time to be 
required to get approval from the government. In other words, acquiring firm has to bear all 
transaction costs until obtaining approval from government authorities such as high court, 
ministry (e.g. telecom) and regulatory body (e.g. SEBI, CCI). It means acquisition cost will 
increase when deal becomes delay or unsuccessful due to weak laws relating to securities 
markets and investor protection, and inconsistent behavior of sovereign departments, 
supposing higher valuation, cash payment. In some instances, acquiring firms have to allocate 
more funds for acquisition when an investment is flowing from developed country, industry 
is largely controlled by government firms. While supporting this streak, we acknowledge that 
because of delay in providing judgment, Vodafone had expensed lots of costs like 
communication cost, legal proceedings cost and other associated costs during 2007-2012 
period. Conversely, both Bharti Airtel and MTN Group have spent significant cash during 
two innings, but such expenses have to be recorded as “sunk cost” due to unsuccessful 
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negotiations. We therefore suggest our proposition for initiating further investigation on 
transaction-costs around delayed, successful and incomplete deals between domestic and 
overseas settings. 
Proposition 4.1 Acquiring firms acquisition cost increases with proportion to deal 
completion process (time to be required to get approval from the government) due to weak 
institutional laws relating to investor protection, cross-listing, and intellectual property rights, 
and institutional officials erratic behavior, if that deals characterize high bid value. 
Proposition 4.2 Acquiring firms acquisition cost will be “more” (more than the 
proportion to deal completion process) due to weak institutional laws relating to investor 
protection, cross-listing, and intellectual property rights, and institutional officials erratic 
behavior, if that deals characterize high bid value, investment is flowing from developed 
countries and industry is largely controlled by public-sector enterprises. 
Finally, we have reached the focal point – how does unsuccessful deals affect the 
given host country’s revenue or income. The extant studies suggested that an international 
direct investment coming from developed economies largely benefits the host country 
economy in terms of new capital creation, industrial development, new jobs creation, supply 
of goods, better utilization of resources, enhances skills and expertise, transfer of technology 
and revenue to the sovereign and so forth of incentives. At the same time, it adversely affects 
market conditions, pricing of goods and services, competition, survival of local firms and 
other uncertainties. Based on multiple case research, we argue that a country invites foreign 
investment (FDI or acquisition route) will lose economic benefits such as taxes on revenues, 
border taxes, capital gains tax on cash deals, and other non-economic benefits such as 
technology transfer when number of incomplete deals or withdrawals increases due to weak 
institutional laws, politicking and irrational behavior of government officials. In other words, 
the increase in number of incomplete deals adversely affects fiscal revenue of the country 
inviting foreign investment. Furthermore, the economic loss will be high if an acquisition 
characterizes higher valuation, cash payment, acquirer belongs to developed nation and 
industry largely directs by state-owned enterprises. We noticed that Vodafone has benefitted 
in the form of capital gains tax that the India’s apex court has given its landmark judgment by 
stating that the existing tax guidelines do not allow tax authorities to impose capital gains tax 
on Vodafone in the Vodafone-Hutchison deal. As a result, Vodafone has benefited 
approximately 20 per cent on a given deal amount (US$10.9 billion), which is equal to 
US$2.18 billion. By and large, Hutchison Whampoa had also benefited in the form of 
premium value that has paid by the Vodafone. In reality, HWL has invested approximately 
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US$2.6 billion in India since 1995 and sold to Vodafone for US$10.9 billion, which benefited 
US$8.3 billion, per se. In the paradigm of international laws, it is said that only an acquirer is 
liable to pay tax and not the target firm. In sum, both acquirer and target were benefited 
because of loopholes in the given country’s institutional setting. On the other hand, sovereign 
might have lose fiscal revenue in the form of corporate tax, listing fees, cross-listing fee, 
border taxes because of unsuccessful deal between Bharti Airtel-MTN Group. Both cases 
found to be true due to weak laws relating to securities markets, investor protection and 
border taxes. Besides losing capital inflow to India, there was capital outflow when Bharti 
Airtel acquired Kuwait-based Zain Telecom [after breakup-talks with MTN]. With this 
constructive arguments, we suggest proposition for improving the current knowledge on 
“nationalism and institutional dichotomy” in cross-border inbound investments. 
Proposition 5.1 A country’s sovereign expected revenue declines with proportion to 
increase in number of unsuccessful international deals. 
Proposition 5.2 A country’s sovereign expected revenue will decline “more” than the 
proportion to increase in number of unsuccessful international deals, if such deals 
characterize high bid value, cash payment, investment is flowing from developed countries 
and industry is largely controlled by public-sector enterprises. 
Proposition 5.3 Acquirer and/or target firm benefits (e.g., undervaluation of domestic 
firms, capital gains tax on cash acquisitions) in cross-border inbound acquisitions due to host 
country’s weak financial markets and tax regulatory environment. 
In addition, this construct would make stronger if future scholars undertake the 
composite proposition put forwarded by Reis et al. (2013). “A greater difference between 
acquirer and target nations’ (i) economic institutions; (ii) political distance; (iii) social 
institutions- (a) reduces the likelihood of completing an announced M&A deal, (b) lengthens 
the period from announcement to completion/withdrawal of the M&A deal”. 
Lastly, we would wish to propose that developed country based firms such as 
Vodafone, Vedanta and Cairn Energy have acquired sophisticated knowledge on a given 
country’s constitutional system, weakness of the regulatory setting, approaching public 
administration authorities and bureaucrats, relation between politicians, bureaucrats, industry 
associations, jurisdictions, media and public, and market potential for its survival. Thus, 
acquiring a firm in developing countries, as India, would be a learning experience for 
developed-country MNCs while making future deals in that country or other nations. 
Researchers in IB, strategy, finance, accounting and economics are suggested to test the 
above theoretical propositions that will advance the understanding of theory. 
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In sum, we proposed new theory that addresses the impact of institutional 
environment on cross-border M&As completion. We suggest that a given country’s weak 
institutional and legal framework and political intervention adversely result in deal 
completion featuring higher valuation, cash payment, acquiring firm with developed country 
and when the industry is largely controlled by host country government. Hence, such 
institutional dichotomous attributes benefit acquirer, target, or both, whereas host country 
government loses the economic benefit out of international investments. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
We have reached at concluding the research for various reasons include research learning and 
highlights of the research. We also make clear of hidden limitations of the research, followed 
by a closing note. 
On one hand, the learning from this multiple case research is as follows. (i) We 
understood that tax, taxation and tax exemption attributes significantly influence overseas 
acquisitions completion. The influence will be more when deals characterize higher levels of 
valuation, cash payment and industry is largely controlled by government undertaking firms 
of that host country. Certainly, it has been evidenced that host country government loose 
economic benefit (capital gain tax) due to weak institutional policies covering tax provisions. 
(ii) We suggested that overseas acquisitions often become delay and/or unsuccessful due to 
strict/weak financial markets and regulations addressing open offers program, takeover 
guidelines, dual listing and ownership rights. (iii) We gained knowledge of IB environment 
that political intervention and erratic behavior of bureaucratic administration adversely affect 
cross-border acquisitions completion. Indeed, the pressure will be more when deals mark 
higher valuation, cash payment and industry is largely controlled by public-sector firms of 
that host country. (iv) We tested extant theories in various management-related disciplines, 
and thereby proposed new theory/testable propositions, together improve the perceptive on 
role of institutional distance in cross-border acquisitions success. 
On the other hand, major highlights of this study include- (a) we reported that a 
significant number of Indian-based multinationals have made investments in other countries 
due to home country institutional constrains. This streak supports the empirical analysis 
where “firms invest outside the country as an escape response to home country rigid laws and 
less investor protection” (Witt and Lewin 2007). Indian companies have chosen countries that 
have better legal systems, advanced accounting standards, strong investor protection, or 
countries that have similar legal quality and standards. (b) we revealed that incompatible 
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strategies, national governance structures, culture clashes and lengthy negotiations, together 
leads to break the deal or delay the deal that influence the deal value and make transaction 
cost higher in the account of acquirer. (c) cross-border deals that characterize higher 
valuation, cash payment, target listed firm and industry is largely controlled by government 
enterprises were found to be delayed, litigated by government influence, ruling political party 
pressure and erratic behavior of institutional authorities, which make more public-attention 
through print and electronic media. (d) we also suggested that the liability of foreignness and 
liability of localness was found to be severe in Indian-hosted deals that characterize higher 
valuation and cash payment. (e) we argued that a given country’s weak regulatory system 
(financial markets regulations, tax environment) benefits bidding firm, target firm, or both; in 
unison, this economic behavior adversely affects that host country’s fiscal income. 
Yet, this research has been carried out based on few limitations. The central limitation 
of the research is referred to data reliability and data transferability. It is because of two 
reasons- (a) significant proportion of data was collected from registered finance dailies, and 
(b) no qualitative research software was used to analyze sampling cases. Albeit, we have 
carefully recorded the events of cases and arranged them in chronological order and 
systematically analyzed in retrospective manner. We therefore admit the jeopardy that cross-
case analysis discussions might be inclined by untrue memories, personal bias (Choi and 
Brommels 2009) and sampling time. While, the proposed theory and propositions would 
motivate researchers to do similar investigations in other institutional settings. Last but not 
least, what are the dramatic macroeconomic changes noticed in both developed and emerging 
economies around the recent global financial crisis and their impact on overseas investments 
and acquisitions. Do successful and unsuccessful cross-border acquisitions produce similar 
shareholders earnings around announcement? Altogether, more research needs to be done on 
pre-merger and post-merger integration phases in cross-border acquisitions between 
developed and emerging markets. Nevertheless, it will also motivate and guide emerging-
markets based scholars in various levels of research activities: doctoral, post-doctoral and 
project works. 
The closing note of this case research puts forward that qualitative research takes 
much longer time compared to empirical research, which importantly needs thick data, 
rigorous analysis of all dimensions, time and energy. We found that the government officials’ 
erratic nature and ruling political party influence was more in foreign inward deals that 
characterize higher bid value, listed target company, cash payment, and stronger government 
control in the industry. We also suggested that a given country’s weak institutional and 
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regulatory environment benefits acquirer, target firm, or both; at the same time, this economic 
behavior negatively affects its fiscal income. Therefore, multinational firms from developed 
countries should be cautious prior to sign any direct investment proposal or to acquire a firm 
located in developing countries that characterize higher levels of corruption, government and 
political intervention, and poor judicial system. Conversely, it is a policy indication where 
developing countries are needed to work seriously on policies relating to foreign direct 
investments, technology transfer, and border-crossing taxes and subsidies. 
 
Endnotes 
1Sovereign risk is defined as “any situation, where a sovereign defaults on loan contracts with 
foreigners, seizes foreign assets located within its borders, or prevents domestic residents 
from fully meeting obligations to foreign contracts” (Alfaro et al. 2008). 
2
TI is an international nongovernment organization was setup in 1990s, headquartered in 
Berlin that aimed to report corruption perception index (CPI) for world economies since 
1995. The index, CPI is being developed for every year on the scale of 0 to 10, 0 refers to 
highest measure of corruption and 10 refer to lowest (source: http://www.transparency.org). 
3
Refer to the review of Indian takeover code (Reddy et al. 2011). 
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Fig. 1 Determinants of the cross-border inbound deal completion across cases 
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Table 1. Theory testing and case illustrations 
Theory Theoretical construct Vodafone-Hutchison deal Bharti Airtel-MTN deal Vedanta-Cairn India 
Theory of foreign 
direct investment 
(Hymer 1970; IMF) 
A foreign national enterprise 
acquiring 10%, or more of the 
ownership control in a firm 
targeted in host country that 
result in capital and other 
resources transfer. 
Vodafone Group Plc is Britain's 
diversified telecom MNC that has 
an offshore subsidiary ‘VIH’ 
located in the Netherlands. On 
the other hand, Hutchison 
Whampoa Limited (HWL) is 
Hong Kong’s largest 
conglomerated MNC, which has 
an on-shore Asian subsidiary 
firm ‘HTIL’ headquartered in 
Hong Kong. Thus, HTIL has 
100% equity stake in CGP 
Investments (Holdings) Limited 
located in Cayman Islands. Both 
MNCs have significant equity 
interest in their respective 
subsidiaries. The key point is that 
CGP owns a 51.95% indirect 
shareholding in Hutchison Essar 
Limited (an Indian-listed entity). 
Vodafone bought HTIL’s 
holdings in CGP Investments 
through its subsidiary firm VIH 
for US$10.9 billion. 
Bharti Airtel is India’s leading 
telecom company and MTN is a 
principal telecom company in 
African market based in South 
Africa. Both had planned to 
merge and create a consolidated 
firm through cross-country dual 
listing. It had been resulted 
where Bharti Airtel would get 
49% of ownership rights in the 
newly consolidated firm while 
MTN shareholders would get 
around 36% equity interests, 
which result in US$23 billion. 
Thus, deal structure in terms of 
ownership rights, or equity 
interest (10%) supports the 
theory of FDI.   
Vedanta Resources Plc is an 
Indian origin, operating from 
its headquarters located in 
London, UK. Cairn Energy is 
UK origin firm, has significant 
equity stake in Indian-based 
firm- Cairn India Ltd, and does 
oil exploration. Following the 
FDI theory, it observed that 
Vedanta Resources has 
acquired about 58.5% equity 
stake in Cairn India Ltd for 
US$8.67 billion. We therefore 
suggest this acquisition is more 
than the minimum equity stake 
of 10% as put forwarded by 
IMF and other notable novel 
authors like Hymer.    
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Market 
imperfections theory 
(Hymer 1970; Rugman 
et al. 2011) 
Markets or industries become 
imperfect due to information 
asymmetry and uncertainty 
decisions taken by the 
government. 
Indian telecommunications sector 
is one of the imperfect markets in 
Asia. In this case, Vodafone has 
indirectly invested in a given 
economy through the direct 
acquisition of HTIL stake in CGP 
Investments. More notably, when 
Hutchison entered in India was a 
single entity that a globally 
diversified and telecom MNC, 
which has experienced in 
providing multi-utilized and 
differentiated services in 
European market. In fact, both 
Vodafone and Hutchison have 
better understanding terms and 
cooperative agreements in most 
European markets. As of 
acquisition, Vodafone would gain 
mobile subscription base, market 
share and revenue during the 
post-acquisition. To our 
knowledge, this deal has been 
augmented the Vodafone’s 
market strength and international 
business network.         
It was fact that Indian telecom 
market largely controlled by 
government controlled firms 
while mobile communications 
market significantly shared by 
private players such as Bharti 
Airtel, Reliance, Idea, BSNL, 
etc. Because of heavy control by 
the government, market became 
imperfect in terms of pricing 
and packages. If the deal could 
have been successful, combined 
entity would benefit in terms of 
subscriber base, market share, 
pricing control, competitive 
advantage, together enhances 
revenue and brand recognition 
in India and South Africa.   
In countries like India, oil and 
gas industry is largely 
controlled by government-
owned enterprises. Moreover, 
the industry is an imperfect 
market in terms of production 
norms, trade dealings and 
pricing control. Importantly, 
ruling and opposition political 
parties play vital role in fixing 
oil and gas prices. Altogether, 
defines the imperfect market. 
We understood that Vedanta 
Resources has to bare some 
kind of additional transaction 
cost in the acquired business, 
location due to no previous 
experience in the relevant 
business. However, they can 
manage all costs due to the 
origin of business group and 
nationality.    
Theory of transaction 
cost economics 
(Coase 1937; 
The cost of business activity 
directly proportionate to the 
degree of firm knowledge on 
Regarding this theory, we use the 
present case ‘Vodafone-
Hutchison deal’ as a transaction 
This theory directly explains the 
Bharti Airtel–MTN deal. The 
deal had been called-off in two 
We critically examined the 
case using secondary info and 
news broadcasted in electronic 
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Williamson 1981) various internal and external 
resources with host country, 
especially it results in higher 
cost when a local firm 
acquires a firm with foreign 
national due to information 
spillover.  
cost. In particular, cost of deal 
depends on what method that 
they (buyer and seller) use in 
doing valuation of Hutchison 
(HTIL and its share in Indian 
joint venture business), and 
market potential. (It falls into the 
corporate finance – valuation 
theory or accounting going-
concern concept.) However, we 
argue that the transaction cost of 
the deal is increased significantly 
due to delay in court proceedings 
and judgment. For example, cost 
of legal proceedings, legal 
documentation, court charges and 
fees, cost of media, and other 
related costs. Moreover, it is 
difficult to predict or estimate the 
trade-off between the deal value, 
market potential and uncommon 
regulatory shocks (costs). It is 
fact that one cannot imagine the 
affect of government unusual 
behaviors or actions. In a time-
bound, one has to face these 
challenges when entering in 
countries like India.   
successive negotiations occurred 
in 2008 and 2009, and finally 
both parties have agreed not to 
materialize the deal because of 
regulatory hurdles. Further, both 
parties did not discuss about 
deal break-up fee. It is worth 
mentioning that both companies 
have spent significant amount 
for transactions like M&A 
advisory fee, legal fee and other 
deal logistics including overseas 
conveyance cost. We thus 
support this theory, which refers 
to companies may need to spend 
some amount on deal 
completion or incompletion that 
directly affect the income 
statement of involving firms.  
media. The deal between 
Vedanta and Cairn India had 
been delayed due to external 
factors and some internal 
factors like due diligence. 
Hence, it became delay due to 
open offers program, 
government approval and 
political intervention. We thus 
suggest that both Vedanta and 
Cairn India might have spent 
significant amount on deal 
completion. This cause 
adversely affects the 
accounting earnings and 
further, shareholders showed 
disagreement against the deal 
consequences. If the deal could 
have been successful within 
the time, Vedanta would have 
saved some deal expenses and 
focused on post-merger 
integration without spending 
additional transaction costs.    
Internalization An international firm buying a We strongly believe that size and Internalization helps companies Multinational firms experience 
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theory (Hymer 1970; 
Buckley and Casson 
2009) 
firm located in other country 
can enhance market 
opportunities as well as 
minimize costs by integrating 
target resources or target 
operations across various 
markets.  
ownership structure of a 
corporate headquarter in 
multinationals play a key role in 
internalization process that to be 
effective or worse (Collis et al. 
2012). In other words, there is a 
great deal of coordination, 
cooperation and control between 
Vodafone group and its 
subsidiary firm VIH. Similarly, 
there must be good 
understandings on ownership 
transfer between Hutchison 
Whampoa and its all subsidiaries 
especially HTIL, and CGP 
Investments Holdings. In sum, 
such business relations across the 
national-borders would help 
while entering in third-party 
country locations like India. We 
suggest that internalization has 
played an important role both in 
completion of deal and in 
winning tax controversies against 
Indian courts. In fact, transaction 
cost was reduced because of no 
capital gains tax.      
doing business in telecom 
services to minimize the cost by 
integrating products offered in 
different markets. If the deal 
could have been completed 
within the period, the newly 
consolidated entity would have 
been gained market resources by 
integrating telecom services in 
India and South Africa. For 
example, post-merger firm will 
have new market opportunity to 
expand into other Asian 
economies like Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc. At 
the same time, they will gain 
some market in African region. 
Altogether, they can integrate 
markets through technology and 
human capital that would reduce 
transaction costs, improve 
revenues and profits, and 
average revenue per user.   
internalization advantages 
through integrating various 
resources or products in 
different markets. Vedanta is 
an Indian origin diversified 
business group, operating 
business in zinc, alluminium, 
and iron ore. We strongly 
believe that Vedanta-Cairn 
India Ltd can save significant 
amount of transaction costs by 
integrating various interlinked 
operations involved in various 
business in India. The greater 
internalization advantage is 
human resources employed in 
the diversified group of 
business activities. This would 
positively affect the financial 
statements, e.g., reducing 
market integration costs, 
improving earnings.    
Eclectic paradigm, or 
OLI framework 
A firm acquiring other firm 
largely seeks to benefit from 
Ownership advantages: Vodafone 
Group Plc is a parent corporation, 
Ownership advantages: Bharti 
Airtel and MTN have decided to 
Ownership advantages: 
Vedanta Resources was one of 
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(Dunning 1977, 1980) corporate ownership and 
control, location and 
internalization that positively 
improve firm value. 
through its subsidiary VIH, has 
acquired Hutchison Whampoa’s 
subsidiary HTIL 100% equity 
stake in CGP Investments. As a 
result, Vodafone has become the 
major partner by 51.95% equity 
holdings in the Indian-based joint 
venture Hutchison-Essar (HEL). 
Further, it acquired an additional 
22% equity stake in Vodafone 
India Limited (VIL) from its joint 
venture partner Essar Group.  
 
Location advantages: From a 
post-acquisition decision, we 
strongly believe that Vodafone 
can experience the market scope 
with their service differentiation. 
Thus, it is an accomplishment of 
market seeking motive thus 
meets the criteria of Dunning’s 
eclectic paradigm.  
 
Internalization advantages: 
Because of global giant in 
telecom business, Vodafone will 
save various costs in transactions 
by integrating services offered in 
different markets. It is possible 
create new combined entity by 
making the firm with dual 
listing option. If the proposed 
deal could have been successful 
in second innings, Bharti Airtel 
would hold 49% in post-merger 
firm while MTN hold 36%. 
Because of significant 
ownership interests, there can be 
lesser agency problems if they 
operate in India through Bharti 
Airtel – MTN, and in South 
Africa through MTN – South 
Africa. 
 
Location advantages: Many 
researchers postulated that India 
and South African markets have 
significant potential in telecom 
services business. If the deal 
could have been triumph, the 
post-merger firm would have 
been gained by market share, 
sales, average revenue per user, 
profits and competitive 
advantage, together, supports 
the notion of Dunning’s theory. 
 
Internalization advantages: It 
the leading business groups 
registered in UK, and has both 
ownership control and 
significant experience in 
materials business. Through 
this deal, Vedanta has own 
about 58.5% equity interests 
that leads to create additional 
rights in board formation and 
long-term strategic dictions. 
Further, it can gain better 
experience in new business ‘oil 
exploration’. 
 
Location advantages: As 
discussed, Vedanta Resources 
was an Indian origin, operate 
business in iron ore, zinc, etc. 
both in India and overseas. We 
strongly believe that Vedanta’s 
business value will improve 
due to their location 
experience and management 
expertise including the 
advantage of nationality. 
Following this advantage, 
Vedanta can ensure their 
presence in the oil business 
and will create value to the 
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through internalization of 
technology and human capital.  
refers to the firms reduce 
various transaction costs by 
integrating the internalized 
operations (technology, human 
capital) occur in different 
markets. We believe that this 
deal would achieve 
internalization advantages if 
they could make success in the 
second innings.  
shareholders. 
 
Internalization advantages: In 
addition to the newly acquired 
business in oil exploration, 
Vedanta has been doing the 
trade in other diversified 
business segments include 
zinc, iron ore, etc in India. By 
integrating various business 
operations within the business 
group, Vedanta will enjoy the 
internalization benefits.   
Uppsala theory of 
internationalization 
(Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul 
1975; Johanson and 
Vahlne 1977, 2009) 
Organizations doing business 
in other countries through 
incremental stages (exports to 
production facility) can 
increase their overall business 
value while hedging the 
foreignness and newness risks 
with host country. 
The case does not support the 
theoretical construct of Uppsala 
theory due to direct foreign 
investment. However, Vodafone 
is not new in internationalizing 
their operations, for instance, the 
company’s global presence in 
terms of number of markets has 
increased dramatically at three-
fold from 12 in 1998 to 38 in 
2007, and thereafter, augmented 
to 40 in 2011. We understood 
that Vodafone is a globally 
diversified telecommunications 
MNC, offers various premium 
services in different markets. 
The case does not support the 
theoretical construct of Uppsala 
theory due to direct foreign 
investment. Moreover, foreign 
acquisition is not a series of 
incremental process of doing 
business abroad, while it is an 
inorganic strategy to gain direct 
market control and ownership 
impact. However, we accept that 
the newly combined entity will 
gain all advantages as per the 
fourth step of theory (offering 
services by creating own 
company) if deal completed.  
The case does not support the 
theoretical construct of 
Uppsala theory due to direct 
foreign investment. Moreover, 
foreign acquisition or merger 
is not a series of incremental 
process of doing business 
abroad, while it is an inorganic 
strategy to gain direct market 
control and ownership impact. 
In case of oil business, 
acquiring firm can earn 
significant revenues through 
minimizing costs at the plant 
level than the decision “built 
and own the plant” (fourth step 
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According to theory, the 
company has entered across the 
developed and developing 
economies through incremental 
decision-making. Of course, this 
decision made the company as 
world’s second largest telecom 
operators based on subscribers 
scale. As of the deal that would 
help the company for further 
diversification in other South 
Asian and East Asian countries.  
of the theory).  Because of 
previous experience in Indian 
businesses and international 
management expertise, 
Vedanta’s business value will 
improve with proportionate to 
the acquired oil business.  
Long-purse (deep 
pockets) theory 
(Hymer 1970; 
Montgomery 1994) 
A firm featuring higher levels 
of cash flows, reserves, or 
deep pockets actively 
participates in inorganic 
growth strategies such as 
mergers, acquisitions, joint 
ventures, etc.  
Because of internalization 
advantages and international 
experience in various global 
markets, Vodafone has gained 
significant cash flows through 
minimizing costs by integrating 
services and operations in 
different markets. As a result, 
their accounting statements have 
improved in terms of revenue, 
profits that lead to have more 
deep pockets. For this reason that 
Vodafone acquired Hutchison by 
making cash offer. In addition, 
they get easy deal financing from 
global investment banks due to 
their strong equity claim. 
Based on the financial 
statements, we understood that 
both Bharti Airtel and MTN 
companies own significant cash 
reserves to make strategic 
investments for long run 
success. We believe that both 
companies wanted to improve 
their cash flows by following 
the internalization strategy in 
which they can minimize the 
cost and improve sales by 
integrating various services in 
India and South Africa. Apart 
from the Cash mode in deal 
payment, they got financing 
option from investment banks. 
It is evidenced in accounting 
and strategy literature that big 
businesses or diversified 
groups maintain sufficient cash 
reserves or deep pockets. In 
particular, business groups can 
arrange the finance quickly 
through their wholly owned 
subsidiaries both for organic 
and inorganic growth of the 
business. Thus, Vedanta 
acquired Cairn Energy’s stake 
in Cairn India, and arranged 
the payment through its deep 
pockets, and stock options 
offered by its Indian-based 
subsidiaries. 
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Resource-based-view 
theory (Penrose 1959; 
Wernerfelt 1984) 
A bidder having sophisticated 
resources actively participates 
in inorganic strategies both to 
internalize target resources 
and to improve its firm value. 
We test this theory at ownership 
view and profit (growth) view. 
As of March 31, 2012, Vodafone 
had a 64.4% interest in VIL 
through its wholly owned 
subsidiaries, and a further 20.1% 
indirect holding giving an 
aggregate 84.5% equity interest 
or capital control (VGP-AR 
2012:118). On the other hand, 
Vodafone’s subscriber-base in 
India has considerably increased 
from 22.31 million in 2006 at a 
massive growth rate 534% to 
147.75 million in 2011. We 
believe that this momentous 
market growth help the Vodafone 
to acquire an additional 22% 
equity stake in VIL from its joint 
venture partner ‘Essar Group’ for 
£2.6 billion on July 1, 2011. It is 
worth stating that Vodafone has 
increased their ownership in VIL 
very cleverly with subsequent to 
their progress in Indian 
subscriber-base.        
Previous researcher tested this 
theory using successful merger 
or acquisition deals and found 
that acquiring firm can build 
empire network and improve 
financial performance with the 
help of target firm resources. 
However, the broken telecom 
deal between Bharti Airtel and 
MTN is not appropriate to 
examined from the lens of RBV 
theory. Hence, the post-merger 
combined firm would have 
reported significant growth in 
financial indicators (e.g. 
revenue, profit, stock earnings, 
cash flows) if the proposed deal 
could have been successful in 
the second innings. Moreover, 
both firms have potential market 
benefits, technology transfer 
advantages, and management 
expertise in the given telecom 
business.    
At the outset, we argue that 
Vedanta has no previous 
experience in oil business, 
which would give negative 
signal to the market and affect 
the business performance 
unfavorably. Because of 
diversified business group, 
international outlook and 
location experience, Vedanta’s 
business value will 
significantly improve due to 
better utilization of target firm 
resources such as technology, 
human capital, and oil 
exploration expertise. 
Moreover, Cairn Energy’s oil 
business expertise and 
technology advantage would 
help Vedanta-Cairn India 
while doing resource allocation 
and management. Thus, 
Vedanta has a great deal of 
opportunity to improve its firm 
value.   
Resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978) 
A strong motive behind 
acquiring a firm located in 
other countries is to reduce 
From the lens of theory, we 
found that Vodafone has 
international outlook, 
We admit that this broken deal 
between Bharti Airtel and MTN 
Group is not rational to test this 
Because of no prior experience 
in oil business, Vedanta may 
not hold better control both on 
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resource dependence at the 
expense of target resources 
that significantly improve 
business experience and value. 
management expertise and 
sophisticated experience in 
telecom business, together, 
improve the business value and 
positively affect the Indian-based 
business. In particular, Vodafone 
can save significant amount on 
various internal costs and gain 
internalization advantages 
through integrating various 
services in different markets. It 
can compete with both Indian 
and international players in the 
telecom market. Albeit, it may 
not control the external resources 
in India, because telecom market 
is one of the highly regulated 
business and imperfect market. In 
other case, it has to follow the 
principle–better use of every 
opportunity while overcoming 
external obstacles. Vodafone has 
increased their ownership stake, 
gained full control and thereby 
created the Indian-based firm as a 
wholly owned subsidiary. 
theory. If the proposed deal 
could have been successful, the 
post-merger firm would have 
gained market advantages 
through service integration in 
India and South Africa. Both 
companies might be having 
better control on internal 
resources such as human capital, 
cash flows and technology, but 
they may not manage the 
external resources in the form of 
market, pricing and taxation 
opportunities. The strong reason 
is that telecom services business 
is one of the highly regulated 
sectors in India and 
characterizes the imperfect 
market.        
internal resources and on 
external resources. In fact, oil 
and gas industry is mostly 
controlled by government-
firms in India, and this creates 
imperfect problems relating 
pricing, supply and contracts. 
However, due to location 
advantage and Indian origin 
business group, Vedanta will 
have better opportunity to use 
both internal and external 
resources efficiently. 
Primarily, the diversified 
business experience would 
help to get quick control on 
resources related to oil 
exploration like operational 
activities and transaction cost. 
Thereafter, it will have control 
on external resources through 
sharing contracts and projects 
with other companies that 
ensure the further opportunities 
in the given market.    
Theory of 
competitive 
advantage (Porter 
Acquiring firm’s market share 
or competitive advantage 
increases when target’s 
We test this theory from two 
perspectives, namely Vodafone’s 
view and a given country’s view. 
It is found that Bharti Airtel was 
a leading telecom company in 
India with reference market 
Based on the theory, a firm 
should gain competitive 
advantage by acquiring the 
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1985, 1990) business characterizes 
competition.  
On the one hand, prior to enter in 
the Indian-landscape Vodafone 
has gained worth-full competitive 
advantage in European market. In 
particular, competitive advantage 
in terms of low-cost service 
provider, service differentiation 
(for instance, one can watch 
recent innovative advertisements 
on Vodafone services), and focus 
market, for example, semi-urban 
and rural markets. Akdoğu 
(2009) suggested that telecom 
firms gain a competitive edge 
through acquisitions. Indian 
telecom consumers would 
experience advanced services like 
3G, 4G and other allied products. 
Since 1994, Indian mobile 
customers have attracted mostly 
by different mobile specifications 
and features, and service 
differentiation.     
share and subscriber base. 
Similarly, MTN Group was also 
a top player in telecom services 
in African region. If the 
proposed deal could have been 
successful, the post-merger firm 
would have been gained two 
emerging markets opportunities 
that enhance the subscriber base 
and market share. Because of 
potential in the telecom business 
in India and African regions, the 
combined entity would gain 
competitive advantage in terms 
of technology transfer, cost 
reduction, average revenue per 
user, service delivery, customer 
retention, etc.      
business of target firm in the 
given industry, country. 
Hence, because of no previous 
experience in oil business, 
Vedanta will strive to gain 
competitive advantage against 
established-local companies 
like ONGC, Reliance, etc. 
However, Vedanta can save 
significant amount on various 
logistics costs and gain 
internalization advantages 
through market integration in 
the long-run. The cost 
leadership advantages usually 
based at operational-level in 
which a firm can acquire such 
skills in the long-run by 
following the principle 
‘learning-by-doing’.   
Organizational 
learning theory 
(Penrose 1959; 
Cangelosi and Dill 
1965; Hymer 1970; 
Francis et al. 2014) 
Firms gain and store 
knowledge from their previous 
experience and others 
experiences, which positively 
result in future attempts 
related to negotiations, 
This case is the best example to 
explain what Vodafone and 
Hutchison have experienced so 
far in the given economic setting. 
We found factors like stress, 
control of internal factors, 
The broken deal in telecom 
business gives a great deal of 
acquisition experience to the 
managers of Bharti Airtel and 
MTN Group. In addition, M&A 
advisors could learn how to 
While supporting the case 
proofs to the organizational 
learning theory, we found that 
Vedanta gained some 
experience in overseas deal 
making, especially in 
51 
 
acquisition, integration, etc.  experience of external shocks, 
patience and other associated 
knowledge factors. We believe 
that Vodafone can strengthen 
their future internationalization 
plans through the experiences at 
(with) India (government 
officials). They might have 
improved the knowledge, for 
instance, liability of foreignness, 
liability of localness, liability of 
newness, informal relationships 
that exist in the current Indian 
public administration and judicial 
system; telecom market potential; 
and so forth of economic, legal 
and administrative behaviors. It 
is too difficult to measure the 
knowledge/experience. We 
suggest that both institutional and 
regulatory, and economic system 
that exhibited in India would 
adversely affect MNCs (if 
establish for short-term) and 
benefit MNCs (if establish for 
long run).   
negotiate and formulate deal 
structure that associated with 
developing countries like India 
and Africa. Both firms have 
faced serious regulatory hurdles 
relating to open offers and deal 
listing and this experience will 
enhance the chances of deal 
completion in future strategies. 
For this reason, Bharti Airtel has 
acquired Kuwait-based Zain 
Telecom for US$10.1 billion 
after deal failed. This infers that 
previous acquisition experience 
(success or failure) influence the 
future deal making in overseas 
markets. Briefly, both 
organizations could learn good 
lessons from these broken talks 
noticed in two successive 
innings.   
conglomerate deals, 
developing countries like 
India. Besides Vedanta’s 
experience in Indian business 
and prior acquisition 
experience, managers and 
M&A advisors have faced new 
challenges in foreign 
acquisition negotiations that 
include institutional barriers, 
regulatory hurdles related to 
open offers and ownership, due 
diligence and political 
intervention. We therefore 
postulate that this experience 
improves the organizational 
learning of the Vedanta and its 
managers learn how to 
overcome various external 
barriers, while making 
investments in developing 
countries.  
Learning-by-doing 
(Collins et al. 2009; 
Aktas et al. 2013) 
Organizations not only learn 
from their previous 
experiences, but also learn 
As mentioned in the Vodafone 
profile, in 2000 it has acquired 
Germany’s Mannesmann for 
It is found that Bharti Airtel 
does not have international 
outlook and prior acquisition 
In addition to the 
organizational learning 
context, we also study the case 
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(gain and store knowledge) by 
doing things in the current 
setting that positively result in 
future attempts related to 
acquisitions.  
US$186 billion, which was the 
biggest deal in Vodafone’s 
corporate history. In 2006, it has 
sold its Japanese unit to Softbank 
and Swedish unit to Telenor. […] 
more recently, its Netherlands-
based firm, Vodafone Libertel 
BV has acquired Telespectrum-
DJ. Thus, we understand that 
Vodafone has a great amount of 
inorganic-strategy experiences 
like alliances, network 
coordination, mergers, 
acquisitions, joint ventures and 
sell-offs prior to acquire 
Hutchison stake for Indian 
operations. We therefore agree 
with Collins et al. (2009) 
theorem that “firms learn 
(acquire) new knowledge (Indian 
operations), and firm's prior 
acquisition experience increases 
the chances of subsequent 
overseas deals.    
experience while MTN Group 
has global outlook, but it has no 
previous experience in deal 
making. We thus put forward a 
comment that both companies 
could learn from the broken deal 
that would improve the chances 
of successful participation in 
future deal making. The 
managers can learn relating to 
deal structure, payment mode, 
non-compete fee, break fee, 
experience with government 
officials and politicians, and 
regulatory hurdles. The ongoing 
experience also reduces the 
liability of localness and 
improves the deal expertise.  
from the lens of learning-by-
doing. We found one important 
finding - Vedanta’s experience 
in overseas deal making and 
new opportunity in oil 
exploration business would 
positively affect the business 
value and learning curve. 
Because of conglomerate 
acquisition, Vedanta would 
acquire new skills relating to 
management expertise both at 
corporate and operational 
level, cost leadership, 
technology transfer, together 
enhance the group business 
value in terms of sales, 
earnings and stock price. This 
streak supports the construct 
‘learning-by-doing’.    
Bargaining power 
theory (Luo 2001) 
A bidding firm acquires a 
target registered in other 
country by making better 
negotiations with host country 
government, which eventually 
This postulates that a foreign 
MNC can success in the given 
host economy if that company 
managers choosing better market 
entry mode whilst bargaining 
We argue that improvement in 
bargaining power of the 
acquiring firm is directly 
proportionate to its prior 
experience in deal making. 
Besides no prior experience in 
oil exploration business, 
Vedanta has acquired 
significant ownership rights in 
Cairn India Ltd. Hence, we do 
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reduces the information 
asymmetry and cost of doing 
business in that country. 
with the government. In the given 
case, the deal occurred outside 
the territory of Indian 
government in which Vodafone 
has no tax liability. Besides no 
proper law, government officials 
and tax departments have filed 
tax plea on Vodafone regarding 
capital gains tax on the 
Hutchison acquisition. Albeit, 
Vodafone has been attended and 
answered all tax allegations both 
in state-level high court and in 
apex court of the country during 
2007-2012. We suggest that 
because of better bargaining 
power (gained through previous 
international acquisition 
experience), Vodafone acquired 
significant ownership rights, 
saved corporate gains tax about 
INR 20,000 crore, and finally 
win over the tax plea.     
Because of no international 
outlook and no acquisition 
experience, Bharti Airtel has 
been failed to materialize the 
deal with MTN Group. We also 
understood that both companies 
have simply developed deal 
structure without lasting goals 
towards bargaining in the deal 
making. If they better bargained 
in the second innings, the deal 
structure (e.g. ownership 
control, payment mode, stock 
options) would have altered and 
result in deal successful. One 
might argue that ‘the more the 
bargaining (not lengthy or 
unfruitful discussions) in deal 
making, the more the chances of 
deal completion. In fact, 
bargaining power determine the 
business valuation of a target.          
not comment on the valuation 
of assets or shares of target 
firm. From the lens of 
bargaining power theory, we 
suggest that Vedanta will - 
acquire new experience in oil 
business, gain management 
expertise, and improve its 
diversified business value. In 
particular, Vedanta own Cairn 
Energy’s stake due to their 
prior acquisition experience 
and location advantage cum 
ongoing businesses in India. 
We therefore argue that the 
better bargaining power of 
acquiring firm could make the 
deal happen in unrelated 
business. In fact, Vedanta got 
all government approvals due 
to good negations, transaction 
handling and location 
experience.      
Information 
asymmetry theory 
(Akerlof 1970; Spence 
1973) 
A firm having better 
information about target firm 
and host country government 
experiences success in cross-
border acquisition 
negotiations.  
Vodafone (may be its M&A 
advisors) has better information 
on Indian legal framework than 
that of government officials 
(revenue department and tax 
authorities). This information 
From the lens of information 
asymmetry theory, we argue that 
neither Bharti Airtel nor MTN 
Group have adequate 
information about deal making 
and external determinants of 
We strongly argue that because 
of “newness” to the oil and gas 
exploration business, Vedanta–
Cairn India deal has been 
delayed, but later completed 
after obtaining government 
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helps Vodafone to win against 
the counter arguments and 
penalties put forwarded by the 
tax officials. Finally, Supreme 
Court of India has delivered its 
judgment in favor of Vodafone 
by stating, “existing book of law 
does not allow tax authorities to 
ask or impose the capital gains 
tax on Vodafone-Hutchison 
deal”. It is fact that Vodafone has 
experienced many difficulties for 
making a foreign market entry 
into an unethical and drama-
oriented politician nation. We 
strongly believe that this 
information would help 
Vodafone in future decision 
making while staying or doing 
operations for Indian consumers.      
overseas deal. In fact, M&A 
advisors have failed to know the 
existing laws relating to foreign 
deals, dual listing, etc. If they 
could have known these 
institutional difficulties prior to 
first innings (or, before 
commencing in second innings), 
the deal would have been 
completed within the period set 
by the companies. In other case, 
the M&A advisors could have 
developed alternative deal 
structures both to satisfy the 
merging parties and to meet the 
institutional requirements 
without political intervention. It 
supports that merging parties do 
not have expertise in knowing 
the regulatory hurdles or 
information on overseas deals.   
approvals. Here, newness 
refers to the business, but not 
to the location. In the given 
case, either Vedanta or Cairn 
Energy has better information 
on deal completion mechanism 
in India. In fact, both firms 
have faced severe approval 
issues relating to open offers 
program with Security 
Exchange Board of India, and 
production sharing contracts 
with Ministry of Petroleum. 
We also believe that M&A 
advisors have no prior 
experience in oil industry, 
especially in India. We 
understood that both newness 
and no prior experience in the 
oil exploration created 
information asymmetry 
problems that adversely affect 
the deal completion.     
Agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling 
1976) 
Acquiring firm managers 
participate in acquisitions and 
make attempt to buy other 
companies at the expense of 
target shareholders (the 
expense will be more in higher 
According to agency theory, 
assumed that managers do not 
perform things in timely-manner 
and they exploit the shareholders 
funds. This theory somewhat 
explains some issues involved in 
With the consistence of agency 
theory construct, we argue that 
managers of both Bharti Airtel 
and MTN Group were found be 
expensive at the cost of 
shareholders funds. The strong 
From the lens of agency 
theory, we argue that managers 
of acquiring firm have not 
exploited the shareholders 
funds. On one hand, because of 
newness to the oil business 
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levels of valuation that leads 
to destroy shareholders funds).  
our case. For example, managers 
and M&A advisory firms could 
have gained significant 
incentives from this deal, which 
were paid by Vodafone and 
Hutchison. On the one hand, 
Vodafone has entered in a 
potential market, thus paid the 
massive amount or premium. On 
the other hand, HWL has been 
recovered from the existing loss 
position. As of mentioned in 
previous sections, Whalley and 
Curwen (2012) argued that HTIL 
could have represented loss in 
2007 when no sale of its 100% 
equity interest in Cayman Islands 
based CGP Investments 
(Holdings) Limited to Vodafone. 
It is worth mentioning that HTIL 
has invested roughly US$2.6 
billion in India since 1995. In this 
regard, one can estimate that Li 
Ka-shing has outstandingly 
gained about US$8.3 billion for 
the period stayed in India (1995-
2006). 
reason is that both companies 
have spent significant amount 
on deal making, which related to 
M&A advisory fee, application 
fee and other deal logistics. If 
managers could have been 
proactive in knowing the 
regulatory hurdles, both 
companies would have saved 
many transaction costs. Due to 
this effect, shareholders were 
experience negative returns 
around two successive talks, but 
gained after the deal 
unsuccessful. Thus, the 
transaction cost adversely affect 
on accounting performance that 
refers to sunk cost in deal 
making.  
Vedanta’s managers have 
strived to seek approvals from 
the concerned government 
departments. On the other 
hand, M&A advisors seem to 
be exploited the funds of 
Vedanta in terms of charging 
higher deal fee and due 
diligence expenses. Because of 
two reasons, the deal has 
delayed, but later completed 
due to location advantage of 
the Vedanta firm, which was 
an Indian origin diversified 
business group. Thus, the 
delay in terms of time 
proportionately increases the 
transaction costs incurred in 
the deal (other than, deal 
value) that adversely affect the 
acquiring firm financial 
earnings in that year.  
Institutional theory 
(Selznick 1948; Meyer 
A country’s formal 
institutional rules, regulations, 
This theory fairly supports our 
case study observations. While 
It is found that economic, 
financial, regulatory and socio-
Researchers in sociology 
suggested that institutions 
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and Rowan 1977; 
Zucker 1987; North 
1990; Scott 1995) 
laws, guidelines, conduct and 
political environment and 
other constitutional factors 
significantly affect businesses 
in that country (the influence 
will be more in international 
trade and investment decisions 
due to institutional distance 
between host and home 
country). 
testing this theory, most previous 
studies do not reveal the 
conclusions or findings at foreign 
market entry level especially 
cross-border acquisitions. In fact, 
previous scholars investigate the 
given sample from the ‘firm’s 
view-point’ and not the ‘nation’s 
perspective’. On the one hand, 
we agree that Indian institutional 
framework is rigid, complexity, 
controversy and frustrated 
bureaucratic capital and unethical 
political behavior, no meaning of 
accountability or responsibility. 
However, this theory does not 
explain whether these 
institutional behaviors affect the 
given economy’s fiscal revenue 
or budget.  
cultural factors determine the 
success of merger negotiations, 
especially in overseas M&As. In 
the given case, we argue that the 
deal has been unsuccessful due 
to regulatory hurdles (e.g. dual 
listing, open offers program), 
erratic behavior of government 
authorities (e.g. telecom 
regulatory), and political 
intervention for personal 
benefits (e.g. various ministries 
and secretaries). We therefore 
suggest that institutional 
determinants play key role in 
overseas deal completion. On 
the other hand, cultural issues 
between India and South Africa, 
and incompatible national 
strategies between Bharti Airtel 
and MTN group might explain 
the causes behind the broken 
overseas telecom deal.   
define rules, regulations, 
procedures and norms that 
require making good economy. 
At the same time, institutions 
that include government, 
political, justice and cultural 
groups influence both 
economic and non-economic 
activities. In the given case, 
Vedanta – Cairn India deal has 
been delayed due to 
institutional dichotomous 
problems (e.g. open offers in 
the view of cross-ownership), 
erratic behavior of government 
officials and ruling political 
party intervention. Hence, we 
do posit that culture between 
India and UK affected the deal. 
This case proofs supports the 
institutional theory construct 
that institutions like 
government and political 
groups influence the business 
transactions both in domestic 
and in overseas.      
Liability of 
foreignness-LOF 
(Caves 1971; Hymer 
A bidding firm participating 
international acquisitions 
experiences information 
Unfortunately, most LOF studies 
examine or investigate the MNCs 
and its subsidiaries performance 
Liability of foreignness is one of 
the crucial factors to be studied 
by corporate professionals while 
When we study this case 
through the lens of liability of 
foreignness, we do not find 
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1976; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983; Zaheer 
1995; Cuervo-Cazurra 
et al. 2007)  
asymmetry induced by 
knowledge spillover and 
higher levels of transaction 
cost due to foreignness that 
attributed by newness to the 
host country.  
during the post-entrance or post-
setup of units in a given economy 
and compare those results with 
local firms. Unlike these studies, 
our case shows the legitimate 
evidence at the foreign market 
entry-level especially in 
developing economies. Thus, 
India’s frustrated and rigid 
regulatory behavior, and tax 
framework are the root causes 
behind world’s long-time delayed 
cross-country acquisition. To 
support this line, we present the 
time line of the deal. Vodafone 
has faced various government 
allegations at two jurisdictions, 
namely Bombay high court (a 
state-level jurisdiction) and 
supreme court (apex court of a 
given country). During these five 
years (2007-2011, Vodafone 
might have spent at least two per 
cent of the deal amount, which is 
an additional transaction cost to 
the company. One cannot focus 
on the company operations and 
the top-level management must 
answer various queries raised by 
making foreign investments, 
particularly in developing 
countries. We thus support that 
the deal has been called-off in 
the second innings due to 
underestimation of foreignness 
problems relating to regulatory 
issues and ruling political party 
intervention. Further, transaction 
costs associated to deal making 
become sunk recording 
expenses that adversely affect 
the accounting earnings. This 
streak also infers that transaction 
cost of deal increases due to 
foreignness issues in the given 
host country. However, we 
believe MTN Group has spent 
significant amount on deal 
making due to LOF problems in 
the given host country, India. 
Since the existing theory largely 
supports the MNEs operating 
strategies in host countries, but 
not at the pre-merger 
negotiations. It is understood 
that LOF theory has partially 
supported by the case evidences.         
any coexisting case proof that 
supports the theoretical 
construct. Hence, we argue 
that because of “newness” to 
the oil exploration business 
Vedanta has strived to face 
foreignness problems in deal 
making, but not in the location. 
Moreover, Cairn Energy also 
experienced the foreignness 
problems relating to 
production sharing contracts 
with its joint venture partner 
ONGC and other government 
approvals. If Vedanta has some 
prior experience in oil 
business, the deal would have 
completed within the period 
with all necessary government 
approvals. Thereafter, they 
could have focused on post-
acquisition integration 
strategies that significantly 
reduce the transaction cost of 
the deal in terms of deal 
logistics and advisory fee. In 
sum, there were no significant 
LOF problems connected to 
the deal.   
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the directors in board meetings. 
Indeed, this issue again raises the 
controversies inside the board; 
however, they have managed 
well in a given situation.  
Market efficiency 
theory (Fama et al. 
1969; Fama 1970) 
Capital markets react to new 
information [e.g. stock prices 
fully reflect available 
information and the reflection 
appear in weak, strong and 
semi strong market efficiency.  
Deal announcement:  
Vodafone shareholders received 
significant higher returns about 
1.34% on the announcement day. 
Therefore, the change in stock 
price was due to new information 
addressing acquisition decision, 
which eventually supports the 
theory “semi strong”. 
 
Vodafone won the tax plea case: 
Stock price declined by 2.51% 
after the immediate day (win 
over tax plea case). Hence, we 
argue that decline in stock price 
does not explain this reason. The 
reflection has not been sufficient 
to explain the market efficiency.  
First innings: Bharti Airtel stock 
price declined by 5.32% on the 
announcement day due to cross-
border merger negotiations.  
Second innings: Bharti Airtel 
stock price again crashed by 
4.83% on the announcement day 
in which shareholders were 
unhappy with managerial 
decisions. 
Deal cancellation: Bharti Airtel 
stock price rose by 3.90% on the 
day after the announcement of 
unsuccessful negotiations with 
MTN. 
We therefore suggest that Bharti 
Airtel stock price fully reflected 
due to the new information that 
resulted in market efficiency as 
“strong thread”.  
Vedanta Resources and Cairn 
Energy shareholders 
experienced significant higher 
return on the announcement 
day (4.87%, 5.32%), while 
Cairn India stock price 
declined by 6.36%.  
 
We thus suggest that new 
information (acquisition 
announcement by Vedanta) has 
resulted in significant stock 
price returns, which supports 
the “strong” thread of market 
efficiency.  
Note: Reddy et al. (2014a) tested theory of FDI, eclectic framework, Uppsala theory, LOF, institutional theory and information asymmetry for single case, that is, 
Vodafone-Hutchison deal (pp. 66-67), which is reproduced (improved) in this paper.  
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Appendix A. Case study protocol 
Task Time and performance 
Research area Cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving Indian deals 
Research setting Interdisciplinary framework  
Research scope International business, economics, strategic management, organization studies, 
corporate finance, accounting, sociology and law. 
Research objective Impact of host country institutional environment on overseas inbound acquisitions 
completion 
Research contribution > Methodological contribution – New typology of multi-case research 
> Theoretical contribution – New theory with testable propositions 
> Implications – New foreign market entry model  
Research method Qualitative study: Case study research – Multi-case approach 
Sampling region Emerging Markets – Asian region 
Sampling place South Asia – India 
Motivation > Growing research interest in emerging markets 
> Knowledge gaps addressing institutional role in cross-border M&As 
performance and its behavior around announcements 
> To propose new business model for easing business-entry in emerging markets 
Sampling cases o Vodafone-Hutchison deal in telecommunications 
o Bharti Airtel-MTN Group deal in telecommunications 
o Vedanta Resources-Cairn India deal in oil and exploration 
Case development First case: Bharti Airtel-MTN Group deal 
Second case: Vedanta Resources-Cairn India deal 
Third case (pre-testing and development): Vodafone-Hutchison deal 
Sampling time  Vodafone-Hutchison deal (December,2006-January, 2012) 
 Bharti Airtel-MTN Group deal (February, 2008-October, 2009) 
 Vedanta Resources-Cairn India deal (August 2010-December, 2011) 
Data source  > Indian registered finance dailies (online) such as Business Line, Business 
Standard, Economic Times, Financial Express, Hindu, Hindustan Times, and 
Times of India.  
> Other online sites include Live mint and The Wall Street Journal and Reuters. 
> Consultants official sites include Deloitte, KPMG, E&Y, Grand Thornton, 
Corporate Professionals-Takeovercode.com, BMG advisory firm, Angel Broking. 
>Regulatory sites include RBI, CCI, SEBI, TRAI, FIPB, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Petroleum, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Department of Economic 
Affairs and Department of Disinvestment. 
> Official sites of firms involved as acquirer and target in sampling cases. 
> International organizations include the World Bank and UNCTAD. 
> Extant literature related to cross-border investments and acquisitions 
> News Videos from You Tube for Bharti Airtel-MTN deal.   
Data collection Bharti Airtel-MTN Group deal – Retrospective method (March, 2010) 
Vedanta Resources-Cairn India deal – Direct observation and immediate reaction 
(initiated August, 2010; closed December, 2011)  
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Vodafone-Hutchison deal – Retrospective method (July, 2012) 
Case writing Bharti Airtel-MTN Group deal (July, 2010) 
Vedanta Resources-Cairn India deal (January, 2011) 
Vodafone-Hutchison deal (October, 2012) 
Investigator Number of principal supervisors – 02 [internal] 
Editors and anonymous reviewers 
Case publication  Vedanta Resources-Cairn India deal (Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies 
[after one revision] in the first-half, 2011) [Nangia et al. 2011] 
 Bharti Airtel-MTN Group deal (Journal of the International Academy for Case 
Studies [after two revisions] in the second-half, 2011) [Reddy et al. 2012] 
 Vodafone-Hutchison deal (International Strategic Management Review [after 
two revisions], in the second-half, 2013) [Reddy et al. 2014a] 
Literature review and 
understanding of the 
case method 
Literature review – February, 2011 to April, 2014 
Methodological review – November, 2010 to August, 2011; July, 2012 to 
February, 2014 
Developing new multi-
case research design 
October, 2013 to February, 2014 
Theory testing October, 2013 to May, 2014 
Theory development October, 2013 to May, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
